

## CHINA-AFGHAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND CHALLENGES UNDER THE TALIBAN

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### ABSTRACT

The new prevailed government was formed in Afghanistan after the United State's withdrawal in 2021. Despite the fact that no one in the international community has recognized the new government, it has been engaged with several states, struggling for the recognition. China was among the first countries that not only welcomed the new government and pledged to work with them but provided economic assistance and aid to stabilize the internal situation in Afghanistan. Afterwards, it has been diplomatically, strategically and economically involved with prevailed government. This study attempts to explore and examine the economic engagement between China and Afghanistan since 2021. The study highlights the possible challenges that may hinder Chinese engagement in Afghanistan. The study explored that China has been involved in investment in industrial, commercial and mining sector of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the trade ratio has been increasingly positive as both countries are witnessing a positive growth their mutual trade. The study highlights possible security and political challenges such as terrorism and political stability in Afghanistan that may hinder Chinese investment and economic relationship between China and Afghanistan.

**Key words:** China, EIA, Sino-Afghan relations, Afghanistan

### INTRODUCTION

This research is primarily intended to investigate economic cooperation and engagement between China and Afghanistan after 2021, when Taliban took over the former "democratic" government in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan takeover by the Taliban after the US withdrawal starts a new debate among experts over the future of the country under the Taliban. As the government of Taliban has not been recognized by any state in the world, China remained engaged and cautious about its policy towards Taliban. It has several "informal" diplomatic engagements with the Taliban since the inception of Taliban to power (D. M. Barrech, et al, 2021). This article is thus an attempt to investigate economic engagements between China and Afghanistan and challenges to full fledge economic interaction inside Afghanistan and the world at large.

At the point when the Taliban held onto power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, most nations shut down their political mission in Kabul and began emptying their residents from Afghanistan. Yet, China was one of a handful of the prominent special cases. It was among the main countries to foster a discretionary channel with the Taliban system and proclaimed that it was prepared for a "well disposed and helpful" connection with the system — the preparation for that expeditious choice, nonetheless, was set down significantly sooner. Throughout the long term, China has kept up with direct correspondence with the Taliban, and the two sides have met on a few events, reciprocally and universally, highlighting China's warming binds with the Islamist bunch (Ghosh, 2023).

Since the foundation of strategic relations between China and the then-Realm of Afghanistan in 1950, commitment between the nations stayed restricted to a great extent to the financial space Beijing liked to avoid political and security issues in Afghanistan (Anwesha Ghosh, 2019). The PRC denounced the Soviet military mediation and purportedly People's Liberation Army (PLA) offered help (regarding preparing, arms, military counsels, and funds) to the Mujahideen obstruction close by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Bartholomew, 2010). A few great many of these Mujahideen contenders were prepared in camps inside Xinjiang; China additionally furnished them with significantly high-grade hardware including automatic rifles and surface-to-air rockets worth up to US\$ 400 million (Starr, 2004). At the point when the Taliban came to drive in 1996, Beijing decided to follow a strategy of low-level commitment with the gathering by means of political channels as a method for guaranteeing security and soundness at its line. In 1999, the PLA consented to offer low-level military help to the Taliban by means of Pakistan, in return for cutting off help to the Uyghurs. Therefore, monetary and specialized collaboration started with Chinese telecom firms fixing power matrices (Iqbal, 2016). Post-9/11, when Afghanistan stood out for the world towards itself, China liked to be a simple onlooker to the sensational situation that transpired there. Solely after an in-between time government was laid out, the reciprocal relations started to expect some speed. Post-Bonn Afghanistan saw a fast realignment in China's Afghan strategy from Beijing's 'clandestine commitment' with the Taliban straight up till the 9/11 assaults to an unexpected cutting off of connections with the Taliban and a speedy rebuilding of its political connections with a Western-supported government (Malik, 2002). Rather than help, China had looked to put its energies in business adventures and Beijing's endeavors toward this path started vigorously in 2007 once the nation was opened up for unfamiliar speculation. The state-supported China Metallurgical Gathering's US\$ 3.5 billion effective bid for Mes Anyak mines — the world's biggest unexploited copper fields, was a huge turn of events (Partlow, 2009). A couple of years into the mediation, there was a huge resurgence of the Taliban, and the Chinese saw merit in restoring their stealthy connections with the Taliban through

Pakistan. These linkages were essentially pointed toward serving Chinese monetary interests in the district with an eye on keeping up with soundness in Xinjiang. For example, reports proposed that the Taliban might have gotten Chinese weapons by means of Iran, while examiners raised doubts that the Haqqani-drove bunch had purposefully gotten assaults far from Chinese framework projects like the Aynak copper mine external Kabul (Amini, 2017). Regardless of its speculations, China was generally seen as a fringe entertainer in Afghanistan till 2014. It was after the declaration by the Obama organization that the US would withdraw its soldiers from Afghanistan in 2014, Beijing was confronted with a genuine chance of a resurgence of shakiness and psychological oppression at its boundaries which set off an adjustment of China's Afghanistan Strategy. China started gathering with the Taliban routinely (Sun, 2022) under a sober-minded methodology to encourage good binds with all groups in Afghanistan fully expecting a US withdrawal. In 2018, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan marked a MoU on counterterrorism and consented to organize to approach the Taliban to get back to the arranging table. China was seen gathering the Taliban in 2018 and 2019 as the Trump organization arranged a harmony to manage the Taliban. The visit of the nine-part Taliban designation to China to look for Beijing's recommendation on Trump's proposed bargain for a harmonious system just showed China's extensive impact on the Islamist bunch. Since the quick US withdrawal from Afghanistan under President Joe Biden, Beijing has been impending in its help to the Taliban system in the nation (Hindu, 2022). During an ordinary question and answer session held only hours after Taliban powers entered Kabul, unfamiliar service representative Hua Chunying expressed that China stands "prepared to keep on growing great friendliness and cordial participation with Afghanistan and assume a helpful part in Afghanistan's tranquility and remaking." (Calabrese, 2021). About a month prior to the fall of Kabul, when the Taliban was consistently acquiring domains in Afghanistan, China's State Councilor and Unfamiliar Clergyman Wang Yi had facilitated a nine-member Taliban designation in Tianjin to examine the compromise and remaking process in Afghanistan

and portrayed the gathering as "a crucial military and political power" in the nation (Hindu, 2022). The Chinese government has been locked in with the Taliban government starting around 2021 when the previous got to hold power in Kabul. A few examinations have featured various sides of their commitment like conciliatory, political, and military. The two states have been associated with the type of financial agreements, helpful and other help from China, and other such monetary commitments that should be explored further. This article principally endeavors to investigate their monetary commitment and difficulties to additional financial cooperation both inside Afghanistan and worldwide in nature.

### **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The Emirate Islami Afghanistan came into power in 2021. China was among the first countries to engage Taliban after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. China have been engaged in Afghanistan since then. China helped the EIA on several diplomatic fronts and had met Afghan representative in world forums and China. The existing literature about the relationship between these countries largely focuses security, diplomatic and strategic issues. This study attempted to investigate the economic cooperation and relation between China and the new government in Afghanistan and the possible challenges to the Chinese government in Afghanistan that might negatively impact relationship between Afghanistan and China.

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

- How China has been economically engaged with the Emirate Islami Afghanistan since 2021?
- What are the challenges to the economic relations between China and Afghanistan?

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The existing literature suggests that both have informal diplomatic, security, strategic and political engagement since the inception of Taliban government, which has not been recognized by any state in the world. (Calabrese, 2021), researched the effects of US withdrawal and open doors for China under the Taliban. Regardless of a few valuable open doors, for example, filling the vacuum of a United States as an essential accomplice, China is

confronting both security and political difficulties that could influence its job as a rising superpower. Chinese association, it is contended, in Afghanistan is essentially vivified by security concerns. Strangely, it is these very worries that both affect China to extend its association in Afghanistan and repress it doing as such. That is the reason, for years to come, China might be more disposed to dole out a higher need to the regulation of seen security dangers starting from Afghanistan than to set out on significant improvement projects there.

It is to a great extent contended that the greatest and essential test for China in Afghanistan is that of safety. A concentrate by (Kapur, 2022), China, which had profited from the American security presence, has become progressively worried about the security vacuum that followed the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Beijing is currently constrained to track down ways of safeguarding its own security and financial interests given the changing real factors on the ground. ISKP has been encouraged by the withdrawal of unfamiliar powers whose past counterterrorism measures had obliged their exercises in Afghanistan. The gathering is utilizing the power vacuum and absence of political solidness to build their traction and mount a test to the Taliban's standard, syndication on savagery, and endeavors to earn global respect. Additionally, ISKP is attempting to ingest frustrated Taliban contenders and other more modest assailant bunches into its overlap. Albeit the Taliban has given confirmations that Afghanistan won't be utilized as a platform for invasions into adjoining nations, the developing number of assaults guaranteed by or credited to ISKP raises worries about whether the previous has a firm hang on the country.

Anwasha, in her paper, "China, Afghanistan, and BRI", the paper starts by momentarily taking a gander at the historical backdrop of China's commitment to the Taliban and afterward centers around Beijing's significant advantages in Afghanistan. It then, at that point, draws in with the BRI, the essential worry of the paper, and contends that the mix of topography and security has made Afghanistan a below-average entertainer concerning BRI subsequently, reconciliation of war-attacked BRI has not highlighted in that frame of mind of needs up to this point. China has been locked in with the Taliban to satisfy that arrangement however the

inner and a few outer difficulties is obstructing China from officially beginning the drive. Toward the end, she offers a few projections about Sino-Taliban relations and sees that China is probably not going to concede to any significant venture or assume any larger part in Afghanistan and rather adhere to a wait-and-watch strategy (Anwesha Ghosh, 2019). While, Zahir, et al. explored the fate of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Afghanistan under the force of the Taliban. The paper dissects the international effects of a shift in power in Afghanistan on CPEC, including security concerns, likely disturbances to supply chains, changes in monetary and political connections, and the questionable idea of the new Afghan government's relationship with China and Pakistan. The paper additionally analyzes the expected effects of international pressures on China and the US during its visit to Afghanistan and after withdrawal (Zahir Syed, et al., 2022).

Different studies center on geo-strategic implications, both on the locale and China, of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. A concentrate by (D. M. Barrech, et al., 2021), dissects the dangers radiating from Afghanistan to China and the area and reveals insight into China's job of protecting its center interest and reconstructing war-torn Afghanistan. They contended that the hurried withdrawal of the US for some specialists is a piece of the incredible power rivalry between the US and China where the previous calculatedly wanted to bring a nationwide conflict making Afghanistan a focal point of psychological warfare and radicalism that perpetually would represent a grave danger to the last option's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China, then again, seems, by all accounts, to be careful about the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Beijing trusts that the Taliban would get serious about the ETIM. Afghanistan's problem has surely been making multitudinous difficulties for Beijing yet China is notable for dealing with the tough situations.

#### **China and Economic Engagements with the Taliban**

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, featured at a question and answer session on 16 August 2021 that Beijing had kept in touch with the Taliban and played a "useful job in

advancing the political settlement of the Afghan issue". She further added that China "trusted" for a smooth change in Afghanistan and that the Taliban would carry out its commitment of shaping a "inclusive Islamic government". Post-August 2021, China's primary help to the Taliban came as a compassionate guide and gift of Coronavirus antibodies. Following the Taliban takeover, the Biden organization froze almost \$9.5 billion in Afghan government assets held in US ledgers. The European Union, England, and Germany all suspended their improvement help programs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) impeded the dispersion of crisis cash holds, while the World Bank ended subsidizing for many ventures. In any case, scarcely a month after the fact, the US and other contributor nations answered a Unified Countries crisis offer by promising more than \$1 billion to address what is going on in the country (Alan Rappeport, 2021).

On the strategic front, China has put forth attempts to mobilize worldwide help and help for revamping Afghanistan, especially by calling the global local area to lift authorizes and thaw Afghan unfamiliar resources. Correspondingly, Beijing and Pakistan have met up to ask the Western powers to draw in the Taliban and to give help to the nation (Calabrese, 2021). The Taliban system knows that Beijing's support is vital for acquiring global authenticity and in this way have attempted to oblige Chinese worries. China firmly hammered President Biden's leader request to free US\$ 7 billion (out of in excess of 9 billion frozen Afghan resources) and split the cash between helpful guide for Afghanistan and an asset for 9/11 casualties. China's Unfamiliar Service's representative Wang Wenbin responded to US' choice by expressing "Without the assent of the Afghan public, the US obstinately discards resources that have a place with the Afghan public, in any event, keeping them similar to possess. This is the same as the direct of crooks (Print, 2022). Despite the fact that Beijing has abstained from and through perceiving the Taliban government up to this point, Chinese media have seized the chance to feature monetary open doors the new Islamic administration presents for China, especially for lithium mining, which currently appears at the very front of their creating relations. However, authoritatively China has reliably expressed that its security advantages are

at the focal point of its communication with the gathering, and the Taliban appear to have answered. The historical backdrop of the useful connection between China and the Taliban fills in as a helpful reason for understanding Beijing's general interests in Afghanistan (Ghosh, 2023).

Following the Taliban takeover, China was the primary unfamiliar country to pledge emergency humanitarian aid (worth US\$ 31 million) to Afghanistan (BBC, 2021). The Taliban system, that was confronting a helpful fiasco and financial implosion, invited Beijing's brief conveyance of food and clinical supplies. In light of the Sino-Taliban notable relations, China's center security and monetary interests and influence over Pakistan and the Taliban system's journey for collaboration with financial ability that can make up for the monetary shortfall left by the US, almost certainly, China and the Taliban system will foster more grounded attaches in the days to come.

The country's significant mineral stores, incorporating lithium, copper, and uncommon earth components, are of extraordinary interest, especially for China. As the world's premier customer of unrefined components, China sees these assets as imperative to fuel its monetary extension and innovative advancement (Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad, 2021). It is notable that Afghanistan is luxuriously invested with a scope of significant regular assets including oil, flammable gas, iron mineral, gold, copper, cobalt, lithium, and other natural substances worth almost \$1 trillion (Zhang, 2022). The Taliban-run Afghanistan saw its most memorable critical unfamiliar speculation when a Chinese firm marked a 25-extended, multimillion-dollar agreement to extricate oil. Specialists are hopeful but still sober minded the task might bring position and pay notwithstanding China's crude record on executing bargains. On January 6, the Taliban endorsed with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), an auxiliary of the state-possessed China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), an agreement to separate oil from the Amu Darya bowl, which extends between focal Asian nations and Afghanistan where it covers around 4.5 square kilometers (1.73 square miles). The arrangement will see a investment of \$150m in the principal year in Afghanistan and \$540m throughout the following

three years. That investigation and creation sharing arrangement was struck in 2011, under the past Afghan government, between China's state-possessed CNPC and an Afghan organization called Watan Gathering for the "Kashkari block", one of the three blocks currently part of the new Amu Darya delicate. China imports gas from Turkmenistan by means of four pipelines, three of which travel through Uzbekistan and one by means of Tajikistan. Afghanistan was offered the valuable chance to be essential for the fourth pipeline (Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori, 2023).

In April 2022, the Taliban supported a \$216 million Chinese investment project for a modern park outside Kabul, as would be considered normal to have 150 manufacturing plants. Reportedly, last month Chinese telecom monster Huawei got endorsements from the high levels of the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan to introduce CCTV cameras across regions raising worries that Beijing is progressing towards profiling Afghans to build its impact in the country. Recently, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed to broaden the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, upheld by Beijing, into Afghanistan. Eminently, Afghanistan involves a focal situation inside a district that holds critical significance for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (EFSAS, 2023).

There has likewise been a flood of Chinese brokers visiting Afghanistan to investigate business open doors and ink bargains (Siddique, 2023). Sino-Afghan exchange is unimportant with regards to China's exchange with its neighbors, measuring just to a pitiful \$550 million out of 2020 (Zhang, 2022). In 2021, China sent out US\$474.45 million worth of merchandise to Afghanistan, as per the Unified Countries COMTRADE data set. The top sent out items incorporate electrical and electronic hardware (US\$85.13 million), rubbers (US\$81.94 million), apparatus, atomic reactors, and boilers (US\$47.16 million), vehicles other than railroad (US\$39.71 million), and synthetic staple strands (US\$28.04 million).

As per China customs information, in December 2022, China imported US\$9.09 million from Afghanistan and sent out US\$59 million, bringing about a positive exchange total for China of US\$49.9 million. Between December 2021 and December 2022 Chinese products expanded by 56.4% however

imports marginally diminished by under 1%. In December 2022 the top commodities from Afghanistan to China were nuts, creature hair, semi-valuable stones, dried organic products, and vegetable items. In December 2022, the top products of China to Afghanistan were manufactured fibers, yarn woven textures, elastic tires, other engineered textures, semiconductors, and vague items (Devonshire-Ellis, 2023).

The new government of Afghanistan has been in chats with China to return the verifiable Silk Road trade routes, especially the Wakhan Corridor, an Afghan valley course that separates China and Tajikistan and associates China with Afghanistan through a 98 broad portion of land. The IEA has reported its arrangements for the kickoff of this passage mentioning the Chinese partner to coordinate on the venture in order to expand the degree of exchange between the two nations and become a dependable course for the travel of products. The exorbitant Wakhan Route undertaking would help with Afghanistan's remaking and change from a nation buried in the struggle to one that produces merchandise and appreciates harmony. Although Chinese development firms are skilled, laying out a Wakhan Corridor course would cost a huge number of dollars, with extra assets expected to give security, crucial transportation, and calculated administrations (Chris Devonshire-Ellis, 2022).

In August 2022, Uzbekistan proposed the foundation of another Focal Asian "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan" (CKUAR) transportation route. The heads of the rail routes in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan met with the acting director of the leading body of Uzbekistan to examine this thought. The Railways Director General, the Kyrgyz Railway Firm Director General, and officials of the Chinese Wakhan Corridor logistics company went to the meeting to talk about the undertaking, with all gatherings included. As indicated by the Uzbek side, laying out ideal conditions for cargo transportation is pivotal while arranging another passageway, and presenting cutthroat rates is of most extreme significance. The improvement of such a hall would assist with the recreation of Afghanistan and help with the change from a country at unending conflict to creation and harmony (Escobar, 2022).

In July 2022, China's extraordinary emissary to Afghanistan, Yue Xiaogong, expressed that Beijing

is prepared to help the execution of Afghanistan transport projects, including a rail line that would interface Uzbekistan's Mazar-I-Sharif, Afghanistan's capital city Kabul and Peshawar, in Pakistan, that's what Yue noticed "Beijing considers Afghanistan to be an extension among Focal and South Asia" and added that "these megaprojects will serve to a super durable tranquility on Afghan soil and develop provincial interconnection." It is normal that the north-south Trans-Afghan railroad will sooner or later converges a projected west-east course that would interface Iran to China by means of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as through Kabul and Peshawar. The Trans-Afghan lines will come first until a last connection with China can be attempted. Talks are at present continuous on expanding direct trains from Pakistan through to Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Territory (Briefing, 2023).

### **CHALLENGES**

With the takeoff of the US following two-decade mission, alongside the Taliban's re-visitation of force, Afghanistan winds up at a pivotal point. The country's future seems questionable, and the possibility of proceeding with flimsiness raise critical worries for China. Confronted with the basis of keeping up with territorial steadiness, Beijing's reaction is formed by the objective of defending security in and around Afghanistan (Saher Liaqat and Abu Hurairah Abbasi, 2023).

China is especially worried about the presence of three non-state actors in Afghanistan: the Al-Qaeda-connected East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), presently called the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Beijing believes the Taliban should close these entertainers' bases down. China's Xinjiang district, where the Muslim Uighurs mainly live, shares a 90-kilometer line with Afghanistan. Beijing is concerned that the arrival of the Taliban to power will energize the TIP, which is the really furnished Uighur bunch in Afghanistan, to send off psychological oppressor acts from across the line, regardless of not having been dynamic as of late. Besides, while the TIP just has a restricted presence in Afghanistan, China is worried that the undeniably worldwide spotlight on the shocking state of common freedoms in Xinjiang will provide the TIP

with another rent of life (D'Souza, 2023). TThe United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

as of late given a dooming report on the state of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Taliban Unfamiliar Clergyman Amir Khan Muttaqi gave a public confirmation at a Shanghai Participation Association (SCO) gathering in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in July 2022 that "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan won't permit any of its own individuals, or some other individual or gathering, including al-Qaida, to represent a danger to the security of others from the dirt of Afghanistan." Be that as it may, Beijing still has some lingering doubts. Surely, the revelation that the head of al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, had been given shelter in Kabul, until his death by a US drone in July 2022, won't have improved the situation (Raksitis, 2023).

Among the inward obstacles that might challenge Chinese inclusion and ceaseless communication with the Taliban. First and foremost, in spite of the Taliban's statement that the conflict is finished, there is no assurance that other ethnic or strict gatherings, particularly extreme Islamist gatherings, won't avoid the Taliban. Also, there is extraordinary vulnerability with regards to whether the Taliban will balance out the nation or support a perpetual nationwide conflict in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Taliban is certainly not a brought together yet a broke association; to that end there is no assurance that various parts of the association won't uphold illegal intimidation and rebellion within China or Focal Asia (Times, 2021). Thirdly, the presence of obstruction gatherings will deter Chinese organizations from putting resources into Afghanistan. Fourthly, with respect to the reconciliation of Afghanistan into Belt and Street, this is additionally possibly truly challenging. There are three primary boundary intersections among Afghanistan and China: Chalachigu Valley, Wakhjir Pass, and North Wakhjir Pass. Every one of the three are unacceptable for framework advancement because of occasional difficulties and outrageous domain conditions. At long last, expanded weakness along the western line of China might drive China to build its presence with regards to security in Central Asian nations, particularly in Tajikistan and Pakistan. This variable likewise sets off territorial rivalry among China and India or Russia, which might prompt expanded key equivocality in the

locale. Plus, the broke circumstances in Afghanistan might divert China's essential concentration from East Asia and the South China Ocean to Central and South Asia to some degree, which could expand China's weakness opposite the US (Sharifli, 2021).

## **CONCLUSION**

The rich soil and strategic location of Afghanistan attracts the neighboring country, China to remain engaged and invest in the country's industrial and mine sectors even when it has not been recognized the new government of Taliban. Despite the fact that the Chinese government has no formal relation and diplomatic engagement, China is informally engaging the Afghan Taliban in several platforms, important both diplomatically and economically. History suggest that China had comparatively lesser role in Afghanistan from countries like United States, it current global rival. The Chinese government, initially, welcomed the Afghan Taliban in government and started engagement with humanitarian aid and economic assistance at the time when the assets of the country were held to be conditionally allowed by the West. The existing research is more focusd either on diplomatic interaction or security cooperation between China and Afghanistan. This study attempted to investigate the economic interaction between China and the new government in Afghanistan. Chinese government and companies are investing in different sectors such as commerce, industrialization and mining. The country has a decade high record of increasing trade with China, while playing the role of a stable state. Chinese companies are investing in multiple sites to exploit natural resources at the benefit of both China and Afghanistan.

Despite these investments, Chinese companies and the government have concerns regarding the situation in Afghanistan. Both countries are facing different domestic and international challenges that could harm the new warmly welcomed engagement between China and Afghanistan. These challenges are international such as security challenge and diplomatic issues that could create more problems and hurdles to the Afghan-China economic interaction. Terrorism and its spill over is the primary concern of the Chinese government as the groups that are struggling against China may harm the country. The political stability is always necessary for the

economic growth and foreign investment that feeds economic growth. The uncertain situation and unpredictable future of Afghanistan may deter foreign investors or companies that want to get into the country for business or other investment. The government in Afghanistan must have to ensure peace and stability so that it could attract more investment, economic growth and prosperous Afghanistan.

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