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AMBIVALENCE HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

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Abstract

Human nature is said to be ambivalent. We have clashing reactions, convictions, emotions towards something or somebody. We cherish and dislike, we acknowledge and dissect, we blow hot and cool at the same time and so on. We are comprised of inverse contradictory characteristics. This affect the way we relate with others and environment.

The problem of social justice can be seen to emanate from the above. It is due to this problem that government institutions was set up in place to checkmate this excesses. This paper is thusly an endeavor to scrutinize the problem of ambivalent human nature in the light of social justice. The paper contends that for us to ensure social justice, it is important that we rise beyond our ambivalent human nature. This can only be done if we attempt to 'know ourselves' as Socrates had advised and also 'allow the limitation of our being be the source of our joy'.

Keywords: Ambivalence, Human Nature, Social Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Our current society is assailed by a tremendous scope of issues – for example, homelessness, poverty, psychological oppression and terrorism. These social issues both reflect and add to more extensive social injustice we face; thusly, to build up a genuine comprehension of them, we should consider the reasons and condition of social injustices with which they are connected.

This is because, one of the distinctive features of a man is the fact that he is a rational animal; he has the capabilities to make choices. Nevertheless, one of his basic problems is that he ends up in a quandary of clashing interests or desire (ambivalence human nature), which unquestionably could influence his activity.



From the inner or psychological side, a man can likewise be comprehended as comprising of various parts. The interests a man encounters inside himself can push him towards accomplishing something he supposes is stupid and that he feels isn't right. This contention in the man's mind presumably parallels the physical clashes in his body (in his sexual organs, his heart, and in his brain), however this is a conjecture.

There can be clashes between psychological systems (in our case, between sexual needs, rational forecast, and assessing what is and isn't proper and right). What's more, there can be clashes inside a single system. A straightforward case of could be a man ordering at an Italian eatery, who is a bit confused between spaghetti and pizza. A more profound and more major issue can emerge when a man has solid sentiments of affection; say for a father, and, at precisely the same, solid strong angry feelings. This ambivalence human nature inherent in man brought forth social contract, the birth of government and its institutions.

Such institutions could be financial, law, educational and so on which specifically is tend to impacts both individual and group conduct of the individuals from the general public. It is important at this point to attest that, despite this structure and institutions there are still problems of social injustice in the society, exhibited by both individuals and groups.

II. AMBIVALENCE HUMAN NATURE

That the term ambivalence is a classification of translation, as recommended by Lüscher (Lüscher, 2011: 191), it is implied in its etymology in spite of the fact that the starting points of the term are unclear. It is made out of the Latin prefix ambi, English word 'around', much the same as Latin ambo, (Keele and Jennife, 2008: 654), and Latin valentia and English version 'power', 'valence'. The term ambivalence connotes phrases such as "both sides" and "double capacity". The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language describes an ambivalent person as one "having conflicting feelings about something or one who is simultaneously attracted and repelled by something", A duality of contradicted feelings, states of mind, contemplations or inspirations, which a man all the while holds towards a man or question, is the centerpiece of the standard psychoanalytically formed meaning of ambivalence (Rowlands, 2009:629). Considering the questionable prefix ambi/ambo prominence is accordingly given to the concurrent nearness of two contrary energies to the detriment of the implication of development, a dissemination and ease of (potentially more than two) contrary energies. This power of a clashing duality describes contemporary definitions, for example, the one recommended by Lüscher, as indicated by which we speak of ambivalence in a social science perspective when dilemmas and polarisation of feelings, thoughts, actions and, furthermore, contradictions in social relations and social structures, which are relevant for personal and societal development, are interpreted as in principle irresolvable. (Lüscher, 2011: 194)

From psychological perspective, a man can in like manner be grasped as including different parts. This word, was brought into psychology in 1911 by the Swiss specialist, Paul Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) (Hoff, 2015: 700). Eugen Bleuler initially thought about ambivalence as a basic side effect of schizophrenia. Laplanche and Pontalis have contended that Bleuler's idea of ambivalence was impacted by the psychoanalytic utilization of the thought of bipolarity alluding to the conjunction of outrageous alternate extremes in demeanors and considerations, begat by the psychoanalyst Wilhelm Stekel.

Sigmund Freud saved the word for clashes including adoration and detest. Carl Jung utilized the word to apply to pictures and also to senses, and his idea of ambivalence dovetails neatly with his thoughts of edifices and of remuneration (Carter, 2011: 442). The therapist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) talked about approach-evasion circumstances in which a man (or creature) is pulled in to something but on the other hand is unnerved of moving toward it or is repulsed by it. An illustration that could be inquired about and measured would be a mouse that, for the reasons for a trial, we have starved and put in a labyrinth toward the finish of which is both sustenance and a feline. In our utilization of the word, Lewin is examining one illustration or kind of ambivalence.



The interests and passion of human inside himself can push him towards accomplishing something he thinks is idiotic and that he feels isn't right. This contention in a man's mind presumably parallels the physical clashes in his body (in his mind, sexual organs and his heart) (Shanon, 2008: 700).

There can be clashes between mental frameworks (in our case, between sexual urges, critical decisions and assessing what is right or wrong). A straightforward case would be a man who wants to eat in an Italian eatery, who is longing for spaghetti and a craving for a pizza and in a dilemma on which to choose. In their jobs, psychologists and different specialists see many examples of individuals who are tormented by ambivalence. This frequently turns out in an inability to choose. Individuals regularly are torn between various choices: They see both sides and measure contentions for and against each side, despite everything they can't choose; at long last they end up acting one way or the other or, maybe, they flip a coin or discuss with a psychic or take after the guidance of a companion or educator. On the other hand an ambivalent individual can move one way and afterward dither and move toward another path and afterward delay et cetera to the point where he or she gets to a point of paralysis. In these circumstances, individuals know about both sides of the contention, thus they can measure them.

The procedure is agonizing, yet it is out in the open inside the individual's awareness. However there are numerous circumstances where the individual himself (or herself) can't see one entire part of the contention despite the fact he or she is experiencing the situation. The problem of social injustice is linked to this ambivalent human nature. This is because we are torn between doing what's right and wrong. This could be because we are so overwhelmed by emotions that we can decipher which is best for us.

III. WILLIAM JAMES' THEORY OF EMOTION

William James' hypothesis of emotion has significantly affected philosophy and psychology in the course of the last 130 years. American psychologist William James (1884) and Danish Carl Lange (1887) autonomously proposed the most seasoned hypotheses of emotion at approximately similar time. Their two speculations were later joined into known as the James-Lange Theory of Emotion (James, 1994: 205).

Both James and Lange proffer a similar point that emotions are consequences of physiological responses to outer occasions. James' examination gave more thoughtfulness regarding emotion as an outcome of a physiological change, while Lange's hypothesis underscored emotion as the exhibition of a physiological change. In any case, the two researchers displayed the possibility that emotion does not begin with cognizant experience of an effect. One would be unable to name a hypothesis of emotion, regardless of whether in the historical backdrop of logic or brain science that is more acclaimed than William James' (Rolls, 2000: 219).

The hypothesis challenges basic presuppositions about the requesting of an emotional episode. Rather than an emotion causing the substantial changes, James broadly declares that "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion" (Adolphs, 2010: 549). Given this reversal of commonsense reasoning, James infers that we keep running from a threat not on the grounds that we are scared, but instead we are scared in light of the fact that we run. The James-Lange hypothesis of emotion expresses that emotion is proportionate to the scope of physiological excitement caused by outer occasions (Cannon, 1987,: 461).

The two researchers proposed that for somebody to feel emotion, he/she should first experience real reactions, for example, expanded breath, expanded heart rate, or sweat-soaked hands. When this physiological reaction is perceived, at that point the individual can state that he/she feels the emotion. Individuals encounter circumstances and occasion that outcome in physiological responses, for example, strong pressure, heart rate increment, sweat, dryness of the mouth, and numerous others, which are made by the autonomic sensory system. The James Lange hypothesis of emotion proposes that emotions are a consequence of these



physiological reactions, and not their cause (Barrett, 2006: 20). Here's a James Lange hypothesis case: when somebody sees an enraged bull:

Common-Sense

Impression of the enraged bull → Feeling of dread → Physiological responses

James-Lange

Impression of the enraged bull → Physiological responses → Feeling of dread (Barrett, 2006: 20).

The impression of emotion-exciting jolts is trailed by particular physiological responses, for example, arrival of adrenaline and flight response. The cerebrum deciphers the particular physiological changes as the emotion, 'I'm frightened in light of the fact that my heart is racing and I am fleeing.' Hence, someone's emotional reaction relies upon how he/she translate those physical responses. A person who has master the act of self control and aware of his/her conflicting nature can put his emotion under check to limit the problem caused by ambivalent human nature

IV. SOCIAL JUSTICE

The concept Social Justice is somewhat hard to define, this is because there are many definitions and many people differ on what it entails and how it should be administered. All through western philosophy, philosophers have differentiated on what constitute social justice. Cephalus an antiquated Greek philosopher set up the conventional speculation of social justice (Herrmann, 2007: 385). As proposed by him social justice involves in talking reality and paying one's commitment. Thrasymachus propounded a radical speculation of social justice. He describes social justice as 'Mighty is Right' (Barney, 2008: 44). In exchange words, he might be right, for while each man speaks for himself and tries to get what he can, the most grounded is sure to get what he needs.

Glaucon approached with his social contract hypothesis, contending we are moral since, it pays us or we must be (Barney, 2008: 44). Plato went ahead board having understudied all theories propounded by Cephalus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, contained one fundamental part, which is that they all viewed social justice as something outside an accomplishment, so Plato rejected them. Plato exhibits that social justice does not depend on a possibility, custom. As demonstrated by Plato in his book The Republic, Justice is internal as it lives in the human soul. Plato strikes a connection between the human living being from one point of view and social living being on the other. Identifying with these three parts in human impulse there are three classes of the social request which are: Philosopher king – overseeing class with reason, who are met all requirements to administer, soldiers - a class of warriors and defenders of the state and finally craftsmans who are dealers and agents in the general public. Justice for Plato is a sort of specialization. It is just the will to satisfy the obligations of one's station and not to interfere with the obligations of another station (Bassey, 2014: 139). Generally, Aristotle assumes that everything has specific objective and man's specific objective is to accomplish authentic happiness. According to Aristotle, justice in individual is the concordance in the human soul, in the overall population, it relate and degree in the fulfillment and nature of individuals (Beever, 2004: 33).

Justice, to Aristotle as to Plato, is morals, all things considered. Justice infers that every person from a gathering should fulfill his moral responsibility towards the related people from his gathering. Justice in this political sense has two divisions: distributive justice and remedial justice. restorative justice is concerned with hardheaded business trades, similar to arrangement, contract et cetera., and diverse things like threatening vibe on property and life, respect and freedom". Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) wrote Leviathan, a book which influenced John Locke and the Founding Fathers of the United States. His idea of a social contract between inhabitants whereby each agrees to surrender rights to the state is seen as one of the best considerations of



the Enlightenment. In former times, the locals' success depended on the restraint or praiseworthy nature of the ruler (Hoekstra, 2003: 111)... David Hume who is a radical empiricist was careful about justice as an objective, add up to morals. In the third portion of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume battles that open utility is the sole wellspring of justice. Hume sees all qualities, including that of justice, as springing from our interests (Cohon, 2011: 595).

Immanuel Kant puts more essential emphasis on intentions and not just on points of view. John Stuart Mill a utilitarian additionally participates in the talk on of social justice (Jacobson, 2008: 159). In his piece of Utilitarianism, Mill battles that, regard for individuals rights is the likelihood that justice lays on utilitarian examinations (Driver, 2009: 14). A champion among the most convincing political philosophers of the twentieth century is John Rawls in his book titled: A Theory of Justice. For Rawls, justice is the "fundamental structure of society". The central structure is the fundamental subject of justice since its things are so huge and show from the earliest starting point. Rawls' speculation of justice is based on modification of two significant benchmarks of justice which would, guarantee an impartial and moral commendable society (Sen, 2015: 79). A key issue for Rawls is to indicate how such measures would be all around received, and here the work skirts on general good issues. Robert Nozick in his book is Anarchy, State and Utopia, is in a general sense stressed with the scattering of property, and fights that justice incorporates three musings: Justice in securing: how you initially acquire property rights over something that has not previously been controlled, Justice in return: how you get property rights over something that has been to you by someone else; Rectification of injustice: how to restore something to its honest to goodness proprietor, if there ought to be an event of injustice in either getting or trade (Gendler, 2003: 106).

Nozick's speculation of justice guarantees that whether a course is simply or not depends totally on how it happened. Justice, Nozick fights, is about with respect to people's (customary) rights, particularly, their rights to property and their rights to self-proprietorship. Nozick thinks property rights are imperative in light of the way that they get from 'self-proprietorship'. It is evident from the above different concept of social justice that man as a major role to play in administering social justice (Gewirtz, 2006: 69).

V. AMBIVALENCE HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Human interest in social groupings are multifarious hence the difficulty to identify one interest at a time. To a very large extent, we sometimes lack awareness of our multi-dimensional interest in a particular situation. Because of the ignorance of what we want at a particular time, which invariably affects our choice or decisionmaking, we are bound to have ambivalent interest; the consequence of which may be grave. The doublecapacity effect of our actions (willful) presupposes ignorance, which precedes our actions. Most time we are beclouded by selfishness and the natural tendency of man to have everything for himself. This kind of tendencies influences our social actions and could lead to ruthlessness in both private and public life. This is the rational explanation for social injustice in our societies. Given the way that man isn't totally rational, for he can act rational on occasion: and given that it would be truly hard to stamp and keep up an exact limit amongst rationality and irrationality. The most ideal approach to clarify human activity 'objectively' is to comprehend this marvel of ambivalence. Understanding this wonder would imply that we should be at caution dependably, for one who is alert will know when the silly piece of him endeavors to oppress the discerning part, particularly as to taking activities which concerns him and which may have quick or later impact on others. Understanding the marvel of ambivalence would make or upgrade our ethical cognizance (Bauman, 1990: 145). The issue of morality couldn't altogether be separated from our origination of what rational explanation includes in so far as we are discussing human activities. Identified with this is that man is a rational animal. Being a rational animal implies that man normally can observe what is great conduct from what is terrible conduct.



This, as maintain by Jacques Maritain believes that man is a discerning creature, since reason requires advancement through character, preparing, training and the collaboration of other men and in light of the fact that society is along these lines indispensable to the achievement of human dignity cognizance (Dagum, 1982: 100). Man often takes part in bad behaviour on account of interest which he may see as positive. In any case, this is just because of good shortcoming. If man somehow managed to take the attendant issues related with his ethical shortcoming genuinely at that point, he would dependably endeavor to be ethically upright. He would realize that similarly as the self-require the general public so does the general public needs the self.

This would constrain it on him to become conscious that accursed demonstrations like misappropriation, vandalization, disregard of human life, and other wrongdoings committed against himself and these would not foreshadow well for the social request. Along these lines, Socrates had asserted that man should "know thyself", maybe the significance is to reveal to us that we have to know well ourselves, that we should know our intellectual and rational soul to help direct our life right (Bowery, 2007 : 82). The more we know our self, the more control we will have in our life. For us to know our self we must recognize and look at our emotions. Our feelings of anxiety – rejection, disappointment, achievement and change – regularly manage our activities and our activities impact everybody with whom we come in contact. The examination of our emotions of fear will decrease the hold it have on us, enabling us to make visible, sensible additionally engaging decisions. It isn't a simple activity, when asked what the most troublesome thing was, Thales answered, "To know thyself." When we know about our self we would know about our restrictions, ambivalence human nature. This means we ought to acknowledge our confinements and conclusiveness as people, while trying endeavors to see these as conditions through which we can accomplish larger amount of legitimization. It is just when we pick up this larger amount of legitimization that our battle and enthusiasm for the general public could have true significance.

The request of this guideline is that we ought to enable the 'should allow the limitation of being to be the cause of joy'. In his "Redefining Ethnicity within the Complementary System of thought in African Philosophy", Professor Asouzu's clarifies 'limitation of being" to mean' the ability to see and acknowledge all stakeholders in their relativity and deficiency and the assistance and administrations rendered to them as a major aspect of the delight proposed in one's own activity" (Asouzu, 2003: 450). Asouzu's thought here is a request for resilience and profound comprehension of the 'facticity' of the human circumstance as a flawed one. To advance a sincere relationship and interaction, we need to incorporate what we believe aren't right actions, carried out unexpectedly, with the positive actions, trusting that the positive actions would change the negative demonstrations and this will at that point prompt the joy of our being. It is germane to specify here that the real founding of human action is or ought to be connected with all world all world common good acknowledged both as a hypothetical or practical reality. Considering the foregoing, there is the ontological precondition of human interest, which can be utilized as a part of satisfactorily assessing the viable circumstances of regular day to day existence. Any demonstration of individual intrigue is a separation from the bona fide establishment - the benefit of all and from the supernatural precondition, which is a logical inconsistency in itself. As needs be, Asouzu submits, "... any general public that demands the ordinance of self-enthusiasm as methods for individual and aggregate self-completion is just making a beeline for remains, turmoil or political agitation" (Asouzu, 2003: 43). To maintain a strategic distance from such a disorganized or revolutionary society, contention is progressed for a compromise of our enthusiasm with each in a way that makes them amicably corresponding in perspective of their definitive legitimizing establishment.

This agreeable complementarism yields the benefit of all proposed as the true establishment of all human intrigue and is symmetrically identified with the verifying establishment of all world inborn regular great.



VI. CONCLUSION

Our human nature is contradictory. We are all troubled with conflicting emotions about everything which includes life and death. At any certain time, we can experience positive and negative emotions, which tear us in different directions. This has serious effect on how we relate to other people and our environment. This has been the major reason for social justice and injustice in our society. How then can we cope with this? We should acknowledge the restrictions of human nature, both in ourselves and others, at the same time, we should also endeavor to retain control of our behaviors. This is what Socrates meant when he said 'Man know thyself'.

Ultimately, our lives are determined by our behavior, not our emotions. This work has been an attempt to show the inevitability of ambivalent of human existential situation as a measure to ensure social justice in our society.

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