

Conclusions of the “Anglophone Crisis” Risk Assessments, and the Predictability of the Crisis’ Intensity, the Clock Is Ticking

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OUTLINE

Equivalent to 12.4 per cent of the world’s GDP is \$US14.76Trillion – which is the cost and impact of violence to the global economy in 2018. Redistributing this figure to the world’s population, \$US1.988 will be each person on the planet’s entitlement. Violence, as a development impediment increases enormous weight on conflict-affected countries’ economies like Cameroon, Syria et al. In Syria, violence has devastated the economy with estimated economic cost at \$US240Billion PPP or

INTRODUCTION

At a global level, the trends in peacefulness has greatly deteriorated by 0.27 per cent in the last year according to the latest Global Peace Index (GPI)¹ publication for 2018,

¹ Produce by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness, measures the absence of violence or fear of violence, as it covers 99.7 per cent of the world’s population. The GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources and measures the states of peace using three thematic domains:

nearly 400 per cent of the Syrian GDP as at 2014. Nevertheless, the question is, with the *anglophone crisis* gathering momentum, **can Cameroon become like Syria?** Inversely, an appropriate question should be, *what range of measures is Cameroon taking to circumvent the Syrianization of the anglophone crisis?* The author’s research verdicts these questions in the preceding paragraphs.

Another intriguing concern is what becomes of Cameroon, with a scenario of high levels of violence, coupled with speedy increase of access to small arms, light and conventional weapons? Are the present weak peace structures and institutions apt to avert the proceeding consequences with high levels of weapon proliferation and multiplication? More disturbing is the low levels of the state of peacefulness in Cameroon, which simply means the institutions and structures that be, do not have the capacity to mitigate the proceeding ramifications of weapons proliferation. The writer has justifiably quantified the state of peacefulness for the reader to make informed judgments and come up with proper interventions.

According to the author’s rigorous research on conflict risk assessments, Cameroon is at an extremely high risk of further escalations of violence from the *anglophone crisis*. However, the author proposes preventative peacebuilding guidelines, drawing inspiration from successful peacebuilding programs in Rwanda, in the wake of the 1994 genocide. Results of the *anglophone crisis* risk assessment illustrates the incapacity of current peace institutions to reduce the crisis’ violence, ensure a ceasefire, bring warring parties to the table and build peace, hence pushing Cameroon further to the brink of a devastating civil war. The reliability of the approaching risk assessment of a civil war should not be undermined, as a repetition of the events leading to the Rwanda genocide. The author’s forewarnings are similar to those of the Belgian ambassador in 1992, who warned his government, that the conflict risk escalation of tensions were high as the Hutus were planning an extermination of the Tutsis. By 1993, the UN Special Rapporteur submitted a report highlighting that the actions the Hutus had already perpetrated (*similar to the killings because of the anglophone crisis*) constituted genocide. Despite such direct warnings, no direct preventative efforts were mobilized and to the greatest dismay of the world, the Rwandan genocide began in April 7 1994 leading to mass killings of an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 victims.

However, the lessons that we learned from the Rwanda recovery and peacebuilding processes, as outlined herein, are even more interesting for Cameroon to emulate.

making the fourth sequential year of acute deteriorations. This deterioration is disturbing, given that as much as the majority of 92 countries deteriorated in their states of peacefulness as against 71 countries that recorded slight improvements. Intuitively, this reveals a world in which the tensions, conflicts, and crises that emerged in the past decade remain unresolved; including the ongoing uprising in

the Level of Societal *Safety and Security*; the extent of *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflicts*; and the degree of *Militarization*.

the southern parts of Cameroon christened the “Anglophone Crisis”. Away from picturing 2018 as a bleak year on the state of peacefulness across the globe, the author researched a ten year trend in global peacefulness and finds that global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.38 per cent since 2008, with as many as 85 GPI countries recording a deterioration while just below 75 improved.

Whether or not the GPI is a hundred per cent accurate in its measures for it to be meaningful is a different argument all together. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that, violence and conflicts are wrecking the earth’s peacefulness and pushing the world more towards doomsday. If it must be stated, the total death from conflicts between 2006 and 2016 increased by 264 per cent, proving that trends over the last century shows that the deterioration in peacefulness in the last decade runs contrary to the longer term trend. This indicates that, the average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated for eight of the past ten years, leaving a wide gap between the least and most peaceful countries. In fact, since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.7 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 0.9 per cent.

It is a truism that other mitigating circumstances have been birth to engender global peacefulness, such as the spread of democracy - reaching a 100-year high, increase levels of diplomatic relations up to about 600 per cent as well as the presence of 77 times more formal alliances than they were in 1918. Other circumstances like a decline in nuclear proliferation have emerged as the world’s total number of nuclear weapons has been declining since 1986, despite an ongoing rise in destructive power, undeniable. Not forgetting to mention that since 1968, the average *armed services personnel* rate has fallen 58 per cent. Despite all these efforts violence and destructive conflicts persist. These statistics, which focuses on exclusively war and conflicts, should not lure the reader to think direct violence (armed conflicts) is solely responsible in deteriorating global peace, as though if there were no wars or armed conflicts, then the world will be truly peaceful. There are other metrics to consider to comprehensively marshal the world towards peace like *security spending, civilian displacement, criminal violence* as well as high rates of *incarceration* etc...

Underlying this deterioration in peacefulness, violence or armed conflict is core. Regardless of the fact that the theatre of war has shifted from the major interstate conflicts, especially as the predominant form of armed conflict shifted too from external to internal, yet, civil wars, terrorism and rising violence are ravaging the most vulnerable countries on the planet. Of a certitude, the problem of violence remains unresolved. Most worrisome is the economic cost associated with this violence on the global economy, as in 2017 it amounted to \$14.76 trillion in purchasing power parity – PPP terms. This figure is equivalent to 12.4 per cent of the world’s economic activity (Gross Domestic Product - GDP) or \$1,988 for every person on the planet earth. It must be recalled that, this impact on the cost of violence to the world’s economy increased by 2 per cent during 2017, due to the rise in the economic impact of conflict and increases in *internal security spending* in certain countries like China, Russia and South Africa. If the reader should know, since 2012, the economic impact of violence has increased by 16 per cent. Meaningless to mention the considerable positive impact on the macroeconomic performance of any given

country with high levels of peacefulness, as broader discussions will be seen in the article.

However, this article presents peace and the economy as *complementaries* and inseparable, because according to the 2018 Business and Peace Report, peace is a good predictor for economic success. Whether a stable and sustainable economy ensures peace is a different analysis all together. No doubt, businesses can do a lot for peace, but for

businesses to be an actor in peacebuilding, investors primarily need to see the benefits of peace to their investments decisions. However, the author’s major findings is that peace plays a major role in a country’s future performance in a number of macroeconomic indicators, especially as these insights are used to better assess the expected investment capacities of individual countries. Nonetheless, economic performance and peace are often mutually reinforcing, meaning better economic performance assist in building peace and vice versa, as together they can create a virtuous cycle. More like a worsening performance in peace hinders economic growth.

Having to agree that peace and the economy are interlinked, a deterioration in one of them may reinforce a deficit or underperformance in the other. This is the main reason why the author quantifies the cost of violence to the impact it has on the global economy. Assessing the risk of a violent escalation or the intensity of an already ongoing conflict is crucial, as it affects the global economy greatly. One major reason for these *conflict risk assessments* as well as the *probability for ongoing conflict intensity* is to notify peace stakeholders’ to enable them make informed decisions on how to transition from *low peace* and *mid peace levels* to *high peace levels*. Unfortunately, between 2008 and 2016 Cameroon together with Nine (9) other countries deteriorated from *mid-* to the *low-level* peace group, as such countries tended to have higher levels of *access to small arms, higher numbers of police* and *higher social cleavage grievances*, as evidenced in the Cameroon context. However, the reader will see further in the article.

Agreeably that violence is one of the most crucial impediments in the attainment of global peacefulness, and that violence prevented several countries from achieving their Millennium Development Goals - MDGs, predicting the occurrences or onset of these violent escalations with appropriate interventions staged may be very cost-effective in both the short- and long-runs. This section brings the reader to the author’s core objective, which involves predicting an occurrence and forecasting the intensification of an already ongoing violent conflict, in this case the “Anglophone Crisis”.

No conflict from the onset can determine the ramifications it will bring, not even the *anglophone crisis* could. Based on records, the smallest start-up of social unrest always almost bring disproportionate consequences. The *anglophone crisis* is a peaceful English-speaking lawyer’s protest turned bloody and bleeding. Another notable example is the case of Syria where the civil war, which started simply by a graffiti on the wall, has devastated the country and economy, with violence and conflict costing an equivalent of **54.1%** of GDP as at 2015. Conversely, pre-empting the outbreak of violence can achieve peace and reap significant economic gains. The economic impact of violence in Sri Lanka has decreased **66%**

since 2009 due to conflict risk assessment and pre-emption, resulting in a peace dividend of \$48 billion PPP, which is equivalent to **20%** of the country's 2015 GDP.

The article will therefore, establish a critical relationship between a robust economy and peace, determining the detriment of the crisis on the economy of Cameroon (Section 1). The article will assess and evaluate the current *state of peacefulness in Cameroon* as measured by the GPI and the PI², illustrating a conducive environment for a thriving upcoming civil war scenario, especially if no preventative peacebuilding interventions are staged (Section 2). The author further quantifies in real terms the retrogression in the Government of Cameroon's - (GoC) efforts to reduce violence and low levels of negative peace on the three GPI variables of measurement, and using violent-prone indicators to predict the risk of the *Anglophone crisis'* intensification, thereby pushing the country to a devastating civil war (Section 3). The author will ultimately propose practical and urgent peacebuilding intervention programs for effective implementation given the current political dynamics, especially as these interventions will have a substantial impact and have an effect over the shorter-term as well as the longer-term (Section 4).

This system-wide proposed peacebuilding scheme would ultimately create an environment for a virtuous cycle of peacebuilding, given that, such program will develop practical, measurable and impactful interventions to stop the crisis, reduce or eradicate direct violence and subsequently abort further intensification of the ongoing armed conflict based on the author's guidelines. Hence, reaping a peace dividend as mentioned in the case of Sri Lanka above.

An additional assessment on Cameroon's achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals - *SDGs 16* is herein, to illustrate the urgent need for the country to implement a peacebuilding program to mitigate the rising risk of *Anglophone crisis'* intensification. This simply means that, if upon these analyses the Government of Cameroon (GoC) chose to ignore the author's forewarnings, demonstrating a violent-friendly environment, together with applicable country examples, then Cameroon's present violent-related predicament (*the Anglophone crisis*) will become more confrontational and combative, as the crisis will become hotter, hence devastating the already struggling economy furthest. These analyses should not be misconstrued to be a prophetic utterance for violence rather a premonition on the high risk of Cameroon relapsing into violent conflict more devastating. The signs are scientifically too clear to be ignored, therefore, the author urges Cameroonians to be keen to implement effectively whatever peacebuilding program, as the **clock keeps is ticking...towards doomsday**. Nonetheless, Research by Department for International Development (*DFID*), Institute of Economics and Peace (*IEP*)

² The Positive Peace Index (PPI) measures the Positive Peace of 163 countries, covering 99.6 per cent of the World's population. The PPI is the only known global, quantitative approach to defining and measuring positive peace. This body of work provides an actionable platform for development and can help improve social factors, governance and economic development as well as peace. It provides the foundation for researchers to deepen their understanding of the empirical relationships between peace and development.

and United Nations Development Program (*UNDP*) all suggest conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions can be highly cost-effective when successful. This is because, in the case of Cameroon, the *economic impact of the "Anglophone" uprising, instability and structural and cultural violence in general* is large when compared to the size of the investments to prevent such impediments.

The reader may as well come up with other valuable contributions (peacebuilding plan) at the backdrop of this article, or otherwise, to make appropriate proposals, as the author recommends.

SECTION 1: THE INEXTRICABLE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY

As earlier reiterated peace can be a good predictor for economic progress, growth and prosperity, as these qualities stimulates a country's performance and investment abilities. It is interesting how the same socio-economic factors that affect a country's level of peacefulness are the same, which drives high levels of economic performance of that country. This simply means that factors like high levels of human capital, low levels of corruption, well-functioning government (Governance), free flow of information etc., all drive a country towards high levels of peacefulness as well as high levels of economic performance. These factors creates the environment for both peace and business to flourish. Therefore, economic sustainability and peace can be thought of as a system that can move in either a beneficial or a destructive direction.

According to the GPI 2018, countries which records low levels of direct violence or even the fear of violence over the last six decades, have averaged 3 times the GDP growth rates of countries that ranked at the bottom of the GPI of that same period. Even more convincing is that countries that performed well on the GPI have lower inflation rates, easier access to financing, and higher rates of foreign direct investment (FDI). This analysis does not mean to conclude that determining the quest for peace is limited to the reduction in direct violence as other factors like *internal security spending* and *high rates of incarceration* for example, are very crucial as well. In all, countries with lower levels of peace, most assuredly, always receive less global attention in the international investment community, as the political risk factor hinders investors' investments.

Contrariwise, according to the World Bank studies, it suggested that countries not currently ranked amongst the world's most peaceful nations might sometimes offer best opportunities for investment³. This is in no wise to say violence is a conducive business environment for investments. Rather, this possibility is conditioned to the fact that these countries must have the potentials to improve in peacefulness upon investment for the investors to see higher returns. Furthermore, for these investments to yield returns, certain macroeconomic indicators like GDP growth rates, lower inflation rates, greater access to private financing and high rates of FDI, must improve. This therefore means economic growth and peace are inseparable. Therefore, peace and economic sustainability are two concepts reinforcing one another.

³ Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk 2011. Washington, DC, World Bank Group, 2011.

The author wishes to establish that peace is a necessary element for business performance as well as other private sector-led economic development. There is almost little or no transactional cost imposed on businesses operating in a peaceful environment, contrary to very heavy cost of transaction in a violent scenario resulting from armed conflict. In countries with low levels of peacefulness, businesses turn to suffer. Even though some argue that after cessation of such ravaging violence, post-conflict economic recovery can yield high rates of GDP growth⁴, despite this; funds do not still flow to destinations affected by armed conflict due to very high levels of perceived risk. Businesses, invariably supports peace, such as the United Nations (UN) Global Compact's Ten Principles⁵. Nonetheless, whatever the direction, this article agrees with the two concepts mutually reinforcing one another, and having a common underlying condition that foster improvements in both peace and the economy.

This article does not limit higher global prosperity to hinge on the element of peace solely, as there are many factors, including higher productivity, itself driven by technological creativity and a constant rise in high levels of human capital, which in turn is driven by strong and consistent institutions. The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index highlights 11 other areas of regulatory performance relevant for businesses across countries, including starting a business, access to credit, paying taxes and enforcing contracts. However, the mutually reinforcing relationship between business performance and peacefulness can be historically tracked looking at the performance of certain macroeconomic business indicators, such GDP growth, interest rates, inflation rates and FDIs. To illustrate, high peace countries ubiquitously have improved average economic performance with lower volatility compared to the average. For example, since 1960, the most peaceful countries have, on average, seen their per capita GDP grow by an annual rate of 2.8 per cent. Per person, GDP is now over three times higher in 2016 than it was in 1960. Whereas, less peaceful countries have experienced stagnation, as their annual per capita GDP growth has, on average, grown by just one per cent over the last six decades. Conversely, poor economic performance, together with factors such as high levels of poverty, unemployment and inflation have shown to be risk factors for political unrest⁶. Another common economic feature of low peace countries is a higher degree of economic volatility.

Violence, a preponderant impediment to the Economy of Peace

In addition to the higher and inefficient public spending, the economic impact of violence is yet another canker of serious concerns. To the global economy, the impact of violence increased by 2.1 per cent from 2016 to 2017, mainly, according to the GPI 2018 due to a rise in internal security expenditure. Notably, corresponding with the start of the

Syrian war of 2011, the economic impact of violence has increased 16 per cent. The figure estimated to represent the global economic impact of violence was \$14.76 trillion in 2018, equivalent to 12.4 per cent of the global GDP, or \$1,988 per person on planet. Vulnerable countries are most at risk as the average economic cost of violence was equivalent to 45 per cent of GDP of the ten countries most affected, compared to the two (2) per cent in the ten least affected countries. However, government *Military Expenditure* to contain, reduce or eradicate violence was 37.2 per cent (\$5.5 trillion) of 14.76 trillion, while *Internal Security* an incarceration was a whopping 27.4 per cent (\$3.5 trillion) of the same amount. Other expenditure categories include *Homicide* at 16.6 per cent, *Violent and Sexual Crime* at 4 per cent, *Private Security* at 5.5 per cent, *Conflict* at 8 per cent and others at 1.3 per cent.

Other multiplier effects of violence to the global economy like reduction of investments in capital-intensive sectors, lowering productivity as well as reduction in returns are all detrimental. Furthermore, businesses turn to shift investment to conflict related goods instead of investing in the production of consumption and exportable goods. However, different countries have diverse impact of violence to their economy. In GDP terms, the economic cost associated with violence for the ten most affected countries ranges between 30 and 68 per cent of their GDP. These countries have either high levels of armed conflict, high levels of interpersonal violent, or both.

A devastating scenario of the impact of violence to an economy is Syria. Mindful of the fact that the economic impact of violence in Syria has increased by 300 per cent since 2007. This increase was driven by the devastation arising from the civil war, including deaths from conflict, population displacement, and GDP losses. 8 years and counting the Syrian civil war has led to the death of between 450,000 – 500,000 people and has displaced over 11 million Syrians either inside Syria or as refugees in the region and beyond⁷. While it may not be possible to quantify copiously the human tragedy of the Syrian civil war, its effects on the economy has been devastating, with a 53 per cent decline in GDP between 2011 and 2014. Using the Syrian GDP data from the Penn World Table and the counterfactual GDP growth estimates from the Syrian Centre for Policy and Research (SCPR), the cumulative economic losses amount to \$240 billion PPP or nearly 200 per cent of the Syrian GDP in 2011.

Furthermore, Syria's GDP contracted by 53 per cent from 2011 to 2014, just in two years. The decline is even larger when comparing this to a no-war scenario and that the country had experienced similar economic growth rates as recorded before the war. The no-war scenario assumes growth rates of 6.1, 5.4, 5.5 and 4.9 per cent for each year from 2011 to 2014⁸. This compares to actual GDP growth rates of 4, 6, and 3 per cent in 2008, 2009, and 2010. In addition to the economic losses, the violent-related cost has

⁴ J Dunne, *Armed Conflict*. Cape Town, South Africa. 2012

⁵ United Nations Global Compact, 'The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact.' In United Nations Global Compact, 2018, <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> [accessed 29 August 2018]

⁶ M Farzanegan, "Can we predict political uprising?" in *The Conversation*, 2017, <https://theconversation.com/can-we-predict-political-uprising-71925> [accessed 29 August 2018]

⁷ Statistics for Refugees and IDPs are obtained from: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Syria Emergency" (UNHCR), available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/syria-emergency.html>

⁸ SCPR, "Confronting Fragmentation" (Syria Center for Policy Research), available at: <http://scpr-syria.org/publications/confronting-fragmentation/>

reversed several years of development-related achievements. Syria slipped 29 places on the Human Development Index in 2015, and Syria is now part of the low human development group of countries⁹. More so, life expectancy decreased from 69.7 to 48.2 years for males and 72 to 64.8 for females between 2010 and 2014¹⁰. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia are just some examples to draw lessons from. Violence can deplete developmental investments several years back, some of which are irrecoverable.

Cameroon will become Syria, unless...

Brief on Africa Economic Outlook: The general prospective of Africa's economic outlook is complex and challenging especially as the global environment appears increasingly fractured. Recent patterns of growth have highlighted the diverse nature of Africa's economies, and significant variations in growth rates will persist, especially if oil prices fail to recover to levels that are more sustainable for Africa's oil-exporting countries. The outlook for 2019 and beyond is coloured by wider global concerns. Much attention should be paid to the effects of the Trump presidency on Africa and whether, among other concerns, it threatens the future of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade agreement. Already, the United States foreign policy on aid to Africa has been slashed below the usual levels. However, it is possible that Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC deals limiting oil production will work to the benefit of African oil exporters and spur a better, than expected bounce in these economies. Economic growth for Sub-Saharan Africa is generally expected to show a moderate recovery in 2019 and the International Monetary Fund - IMF forecasts that regional GDP growth will be back above 4 per cent by 2019.

More specifically, trickling down these records to Cameroon's economic outlook is even more interesting. A brief overview of the nation's economic performance and outlook borderlines will be instructive. Considered the strongest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Cameroon has long been resilient to economic shocks, but its economy is showing early signs of a slowdown. GDP growth has been steady since 2010, averaging 5.8 per cent from 2013 to 2015 before falling to 4.7 per cent in 2016. Lagging oil and gas prices resulted in postponement of investment in exploration and production, which led to a decline in extractive activities. The recession in Nigeria, the widening crisis in CEMAC, and the 'anglophone crisis' hurts domestic and external demand. These headwinds lowered the growth rate to an estimated 3.4 per cent in 2017. However, the outlook beyond remains positive, with growth of 4.1 per cent in 2018 and 4.8 per cent projected in 2019, spurred by higher exports to the European Union following the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and increased energy supply due to new hydroelectric dams. Other tailwinds affecting growth include

the development of forestry and agro-industrial value chains, as well as a reduction in imports in favour of local products.

More so, the macroeconomic picture is even more necessary. Cameroon has signed an economic and financial partnership agreement (the Extended Credit Facility) with the IMF that will stabilize the macroeconomic framework in the medium term by requiring a restrictive fiscal policy for 2017–19. Public investment is expected to drop from roughly 8 per cent of GDP in 2016 to 6.7 per cent in 2017 and 6.6 per cent in 2019. Government revenues are projected to rise from 16.1 per cent of GDP in 2016 to 17.7 per cent in 2017 and 18.16 per cent in 2019. The budget deficit dropped from 6.1 per cent in 2016 to an estimated 3.6 per cent in 2017. This budget deficit is further projected to remain below 3 per cent in 2018–19. The debt ratio is below the CEMAC ceiling of 70 per cent of GDP. However, the use of commercial loans to finance infrastructure projects caused public debt to spike to 34.1 per cent of GDP in 2016, up from 15.6 per cent in 2012; as a result, the risk of debt distress rose from moderate to high. Although the level of indebtedness remains supportable, it needs to be managed with great care. The authorities should step up their efforts to expand the non-oil revenue base and better prioritize spending while preserving social spending. To maintain debt sustainability, new non-concessional borrowing should be reserved for projects with a high social or growth impact, in industries and sectors with clear competitive potential. Additional measures to enhance public financial and debt management are needed to improve spending efficiency and control fiscal risks.

Cameroon's economic outlook seems positive amidst significant unrest and this is liable to perturb the growth process, especially given that in the sub-Sahara African region, the most notable deteriorations in peacefulness was Cameroon. Note that, Syria was negatively more peaceful than Cameroon two years prior to the onset of the Syrian Civil war in 2011. This means, Cameroon is not invulnerable to the scale of violence currently displaying in Syria, as a more analytical argument will ensue.

Comparing the economic indicators of Cameroon with those of Syria in the pre-conflicts periods leading up to the Syrian uprising, Syria did much better than the sub-Sahara African country, yet, violence that started with a graffiti on the wall has wasted Syria unimaginably. **Can Cameroon become the next Syria?** This will take the article to the next section. Nonetheless, the *anglophone crisis* is already weighing on the economy of Cameroon, as this will invariably affect the entire sub region. According to GICAM – a national inter employers group, based in Douala (the economic capital) announces that the cocoa and coffee production have come to a halt, two major income producing ventures for the state. According to TELCAR Cocoa LTD, the crisis marked with high levels of insecurity has caused an 80 per cent fall in Cocoa trade, as the main cocoa producer – the Southwest region would see a significant drop by 43000 tons (45.45 per cent to 32 per cent) in production. This further implies a CFA56billion loss in export revenues, as multiplier effects such as producers' direct revenue drops by a total of CFA35million, as well as premium to farmers' loss of CFA3billion. In addition, during the cocoa season of 2018/2019, the projections are that Cameroon stands to lose between 60,000 tons and 100,000 tons of local productions due to the ongoing crisis. According to GICAM, this could be translated into a CFA78-130billion

⁹ "Human Development Report 2016: Human Development For Everyone" [2016] United Nations Development Programme, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf

¹⁰ SCPR, "Forced Dispersion, Syrian Human Status: The Demographic Report 2016" (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2016), available at: <http://scpr-syria.org/publications/forced-dispersion-syria-human-status-the-demographic-report-2016/>

loss in export revenue (Foreign Currency), including CFA49-81billion in Southwest producers' income. More so, Gicam highlights that Cameroon lost a whopping CFA6billion in tax revenues and CFA269billion in turnover with high levels of job cut. The unrest already cost CFA2, 153billion in real property, rolling stock and furniture while the turnover shortage is valued at CFA269, 056billion. This shortage in business turnover implies an immediate loss of CFA5.9billion in Government's tax revenue, as a deposit of corporate tax [the rate of which is set at 2.2 per cent calculated on turnover].

In terms of job losses, the crisis has led to 70 per cent increase in unemployment, as the agro-industrial companies' tops the list. Overall, an additional 8000 jobs are envisaged to be lost in the formal sector, in addition to the 6,434 jobs lost already. Quantifying the economic impact of high levels of unemployment is unfeasible due to lack of available data, but for all we know, it is gruesome and horrific.

The question is whether Cameroon's institutions are strong and resilient enough to shock-absorbed these endogenous shockwaves because of the crisis, as was the case of Iceland during the 2008 financial crisis or Japan during the Tsunami in 2011. Seeing the effect on the microeconomic level unleashes a better platform of prediction on the effect of a crumbling economy to the state of peace in Cameroon. Can Cameroon redress this situation to enable the country reap a peace dividend as was the case of Sri Lanka, following a 66 per cent in 2009 of decrease in the economic impact of violence from the militant group LTTE, which resulted in a peace dividend of \$48billion, equivalent to a 20 per cent of the country's GDP in 2015? Alternatively, will the GoC leave the crisis plunge the nation into a 53 per cent cost to its GDP like was the case of Syria? The latter case is most likely given the indicators the GoC uses to contain the crisis.

SECTION 2 HIGH LEVELS OF VIOLENCE, ACCESS TO LIGHT WEAPONS AND WEAK PEACE INSTITUTIONS SETS A CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR AN ANTICIPATED OR IMPENDING CIVIL WAR SCENARIO

Peace is a complex concept, broader in studies than security, however, it was universally recognized as important to define and quantitatively measure. The sociopolitical structure of Cameroon is in dire need for peacebuilding reconstruction, especially given the mounting social unrest by the 'anglophone crisis', accompanied with other peace impediments like the 2018 teachers' union protest pertaining to claims of unpaid salaries, and the recent political instability in Yaoundé. Fellow Cameroonians, the nation is not as peaceful as it is ubiquitously misconstrued to be. The dominance of negative peace – defined as the mere *absence of direct violence* or the absence of the fear of violence, has prevailed in Cameroon. Unfortunately, no peaceful country relied on the deceptive *absence of violence* to build resilience, a foundation to sustainable growth and prosperity. In fact, a cross-sectional multivariate regression survey agrees that, the dominance of negative peace within any given society is a time bomb, waiting for detonation especially when pressures mount. For better understanding, it will be instructive to measure the state of peacefulness in Cameroon by Global Peace Index measuring standards and indicators.

Measuring and Quantifying the State of Peace in Cameroon

Comprised of 22 indicators, the GPI 2017 ranks Cameroon's level of negative peacefulness – simply the absence of violence, 130th¹¹ out of 165 countries with a score of 2.39 out of 10, falling just after Iran. Cameroon ranks 99 as a percentage on the *Economic Cost of Violence*¹² out of 163, with an *Economic impact of violence*¹³ at \$US6984Million PPP. The economic cost of violence records at \$US5401.2Million PPP, affecting a per capita of \$US218.9 with a percentage of GDP of 6.4 per cent.

According to the GPI 2016¹⁴, out of 163 (163 being the worse rank), Cameroon ranks 110th, with registered economic cost at approximately US\$ 5, 071Million Purchasing Power Parity - PPP, affecting per capita at US\$ 214 at an overall GDP percentage at 6.4% in 2016 increasing from 4% from 2015 records. From the statistics, it is evident that even the level of negative peacefulness, Cameroon is not performing well; as such, volatile environments cannot guarantee true peace. As a reminder, no emerging economy relies on the sheer and deceptive absence of violence (negative peace) as a foundation to spur economic growth.

Prior to analyzing Cameroon through the lens of the GPI domain scores, it is imperative to carry on a comparative data analysis on the state of negative peacefulness from 2016 (when the crisis resulted) and 2017 to get a vivid picture of peace deteriorations in the country. According to the GPI 2016 and 2017, Cameroon ranks 110th and 130th, out of 163 (163 being the worse rank) respectively. Following major macroeconomic indicators, like GDP per capita rates, the crisis evidently, is devastating the human potentials and livelihood of fellow Cameroonians.

Even more worrying is the comparative data on Syrian state of peacefulness in 2008 and 2009, two years prior to the outbreak of the ravaging civil war, with that of Cameroon. Accordingly, in 2008 Syria ranked 92 with a score of 2.049, meanwhile Cameroon was rank 95 with a score of 2.073, all out of 144 countries. This means that, while Syria was more peaceful than Cameroon, yet civil uprising has shrunken the country, implying Cameroon that was least peaceful may become Syria if no interventions are taken. Therefore, Cameroon as in Syria is a breeding ground for violent escalations especially as the pillars and structures on which sustains peaceful societies are tremendously weak. If no peacebuilding interventions are done, Cameroon risk becoming modern day Syria.

"Anglophone crisis" under the Global Peace Domains' Scanner

¹¹ This ranking is the Economic Cost of Violence rank by Percentage of GDP

¹² The *Economic Cost of Violence* represents the direct and indirect cost of violence in this case the *Anglophone crisis*

¹³ The term the *Economic Impact of Violence* is used to explain the combined effect of direct and indirect costs and the *multiplier effect*. The *Multiplier effect* represents the flow-on effect of direct cost, such as additional economic benefit that would accrue or come from investment in business development or education instead of containing or dealing with violence, with these expenditures allocated to productive areas of the economy. (the economy of Cameroon)

¹⁴ Global Peace Index, 2017.

The GPI uses three domains to measure the state of negative peacefulness in Cameroon: *the extent to which countries (in this case Cameroon) are involved in ongoing domestic (anglophone crisis) and international conflicts*, *the level of Cameroon's societal safety and security*, and *the extent to which a country (Cameroon) is militarized*. Looking at the global trends the world has become less peaceful, even though contrary to public perception, some domains have improved, like the *Militarization* domain which improved by 3.17 per cent, driven by large reductions in *military spending* and the size of the armed forces in many countries. However, the *Safety and Security* Domain deteriorated by 2.97 per cent and the *Ongoing Conflict* domain also deteriorated, falling by 5.94 per cent. According to highlight government types by the Economic Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Index, the rise and fall of these domains varies, as the greatest decline of the *Ongoing Conflict* domain was perceived in *authoritarian regimes*¹⁵ with a vast majority of active armed conflict (*Anglophone crisis* for example) in the sub-Sahara Africa (Cameroon inclusive) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The author examines the indicators under each domain as they relate to the case of Cameroon below.

1. Ongoing Conflict domain (Anglophone Crisis)

Let the Ongoing Conflict be the *Anglophone crisis* to enable easy comprehension. The crisis has registered the largest shift in peacefulness and such deterioration usually have spillover effects, which are hard to rectify almost instantaneously. The indicators to determine whether the *anglophone crisis* has a toll on the state of peacefulness in Cameroon are political instability, internal (*anglophone crisis*) and external (*boko Haram in the Eastern part of Nigeria*) armed conflict, deaths from armed conflict (*the anglophone crisis*), as well as soaring relations with neighboring countries (in this case Nigeria). The *anglophone* uprising has recorded rising death rates, as the crisis negatively affects the level of peacefulness in Cameroon. On a scoring scale from 1 to 5, (with 5 being the worse score), Cameroon records a score of 2.5, with North Korea scoring 2.6¹⁶.

2. Safety and Security domain

Data for an effective evaluation of the state of insecurity may not be readily available but the facts on the ground are telling. However, this unavailability of data, it is possible to discern trends of insecurity and safety in Cameroon, due to the *Anglophone crisis*. In fact, according to the GPI 2018, Cameroon scores 3 (with 5 being the worse score) with Pakistan and North Korea following after it. Reading these indicators, the reader may be convinced. Due to the rise of the conflict's intensification, *Homicide* rates have increased, as this indicator is considered one of the most consistent and reliable comparable aspects of societal violence. High rates of *Incarceration* has ensued as well. Other indicators like *Terrorism, Refugees and IDPs* are evident because of the crisis.

3. Militarization domain

Indicators such as high levels of *Military Expenditure* to combat rising terrorism is evident, enlisting of *Armed Services Personnel*, high levels of *Weapons Importation*, are all having a great toll on the Cameroon economy.

What are these assessments translating into for Cameroon? By the above analysis, Cameroon has not shown any significant reductions in violence, as the *anglophone crisis* gets hotter by the day, rather the GoC's reluctant has increased civilian access to small arms and light weapons, even as far as other conventional weaponry. Low commitment levels of the GoC, has seen high levels of corruption persisting, low levels of adequate peace institutions and peacebuilding plan, as well as weak peace commissions to combat the high levels of violence ongoing. As a fact, Cameroon has portrayed glaring characteristics of the level of peace deteriorations according to the GPI scoreboard. The PPI 2018 outlined characteristics common to countries that experienced large deterioration, and Cameroon lists among the top 20 largest peace deterioration from 2005 to 2014. These characteristics were that the countries must have experienced deteriorations in access to and quality of information (*remember the internet shutdown in the anglophone regions?*); the countries must have had rising tensions between groups and levels of corruption; and must have had easier access to small arms and light weapons. Sampling Cameroon, these are all evident.

As the author closes this section, the article's objectives are meant to stimulate and reawaken the mindfulness of the Cameroonian people to determine to build strong institutions and structures to solve the violent-related effects caused by the *anglophone crisis*. Peace is a prerequisite, as it is associated with other UN developmental variables such as business competitiveness and entrepreneurialism, foundations of Cameroonian citizens' wellbeing, gender equality/empowerment, Cameroon youth development, social cohesion and capital, greater food security, and high levels of environmental sustainability.

SECTION 3 CAMEROON, AT THE BRINK OF A DEVASTATING CIVIL WAR BASED ON RESULTS OF CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL(S)

Conflict risk assessments are novelty mechanisms used mostly in the field of preventative peacebuilding to enable effective intervention in the event of an anticipated conflict uprising. An effective forecast with appropriate intervention is capable of positively influencing changes in the Institute of Economic and Peace's GPI, which measures countries' levels of peacefulness. Given the difficulty in forecasting the onset of large-scale violence, it is imperative to comprehend and conceptualize new approaches to measuring the risk of conflict occurrence. As **SECTION 2** analyzed, the global trends in peacefulness for the last ten years is low, as violence is at its 100-year high of all times. Such levels of deterioration marked by heightened ongoing internal conflicts, with spillover effects such as massive displacement of people has a toll on the global economy and stability. While some risk can be correctly foreseen and appropriate interventions staged, profoundly destabilizing events such as civil unrest, conflict onset and the collapse of entire countries have, all too often taken the world by surprise.

Failure to predict accurately the onset of large fabricated occurrences like the Syrian civil war and the *Anglophone crisis* has substantial impacts on economic development and geopolitical stability. It should therefore not be a surprise to see that key policymakers, businesses and civil society activist, seek new ways to determine and successfully predict likelihood of big risks and implement ways on mitigating these risks from maturing. Researched by DFID,

¹⁵ According to the EIU Index, Cameroon is ranked under *authoritarian regimes*

¹⁶ GPI 2018

IEP and UNDP all suggest that the cost for conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions can be highly cost-effective when successful, given that the cost of violence and its impact to the global economy is estimated at \$US14.6Trillion. These economic losses highlights the importance of better anticipation and predictions of conflicts, underlying how it is for research to develop tangible premonitions to prevent onset or further escalations of ongoing conflicts, like the *Anglophone crisis*.

This is most assuredly partly, why the UN is currently re-prioritizing its efforts around conflict prevention through the **"Sustaining Peace Agenda"**, more so as the UN Secretary General – Antonio Gutiérrez emphasizes conflict prevention as the priority for the UN system. Even more interesting is the underlying call of the *UN Sustaining Peace Agenda* to help international community better pre-empt conflict and gradually move policymakers and governments away from reactive approaches to crisis.

Why Assessed Conflict Risk?

The world is already at a 40 year high in terms of the number of conflicts and deaths resulting from them, which deaths are at a 25-year high. The weight of the impact of violence on the global economy is equivalent to 14 per cent of global GDP, which makes it enormous. Finding sustainable ways to reduce the cost of violence by investing in peacebuilding ventures increase the *Economic of Peace* value greatly. Take for instance the size of both cost – the cost to prevent and predict conflicts, and the cost to contain, and manage conflicts are worlds apart. Investments to prevent conflicts are likely to be economically higher and cost-effective to the cost of violence itself.

More important is the fact that, the size of investments in conflict prevention are very small compared to the consequential losses from conflicts. Simply to illustrate, the annual expenditure on preventative peacebuilding is approximately US\$8Billion compared to the direct losses from conflict, which were some \$US750Billion in 2015, alone. Meanwhile the annual investment in preventative peacebuilding, which can be considered to be the most holistic form of investments to reduce violence, is at a staggering \$US6.8Billion. The relatively small amount in the size of peacebuilding investments underscores the potential cost-savings from higher levels of preventative investments.

If these investments in preventative peacebuilding can successfully identify countries at risk of violent occurrences, (maybe, say 5years in advance), with meaningful interventions staged, outrageous peace dividends like the case of Sri Lanka could be re-invested in productive areas of the economy. According to the IEP analysis to this effect, the cost ratio of peacebuilding or the actions that lead to conflict prevention is **1:16** on average. Meaning, for every US\$1 invested in a preventative peacebuilding, a cost of violence of \$US16 is saved. This simply translates to the case of Cameroon that for every CFA500 invested in preventative peacebuilding; the investor(s) are saving up approximately CFA8000 in the cost of violence.

The main reason therefore to assess risk is to better anticipate conflicts and engage-in timely preventative peacebuilding interventions in a bid to reduce the cost associated with violence.

Risk Assessment Accuracy

In a bid to moderate on the excessive cost of violence on the global economy, the IEP developed two types of forward-looking risk models¹⁷ to enable researchers in conflict prevention, predict future changes in the GPI. The results of both models have been performance tested in a number of ways and compared against five other measures commonly used to forecast conflict and understand vulnerabilities to violence.

For the purpose of this article, the Positive Peace Deficit Model will be the referenced risk measurement tool, as the majority of results that would be discussed are from this risk model. This model successfully forecasted several notable peace deteriorations since 2008. For example, looking at the 10 most at-Risk countries, 5 of them experienced significant declines in peace as they included *Syria, Mozambique, Eritrea, Niger and Vietnam*. The country that experienced the largest deterioration was Syria, which ranked at the time 99th out of 163 countries in 2008, but fell according to the predictions to the last in 2016. This was a remarkable prediction, even though many in the international community considered it a relatively stable country.

Cameroon, at High Risk of Further Violence Eruption

Of the 20 countries that fell into conflicts between 2008 and 2017, all were Positive Peace Deficit model predictions, for which Cameroon was included to be at-high risk. Impliedly, this model is determining that Cameroon has weak peace institutions and social structures to sustain a violent-free environment. More importantly, the first set of experiment of this risk model to Cameroon was to test via a simple approach to determine if the most-at-risk indeed experienced deterioration in peace over a ten-year period. Of the 10 countries most-at-risk according to the 2008 forecast, 5 experienced notable deterioration in peacefulness. The threshold of this deterioration is determined by changes in *political instability, domestic political violence, conflict deaths and interpersonal violence*, all of which are evidenced in Cameroon.

Given the complexities involved in building accurate models that are capable of predicting falls in peace, existing risk measurement models do not need to be 100 per cent accurate for them to be useful. The converse question will be thus; how accurate does a conflict risk model need to be in order to be useful? The author answers this question in the context of preventative peacebuilding, with direct relation to the current crisis. If the cost for a preventative peacebuilding intervention to curb further violent eruption in the *Anglophone regions* seem higher than the cost of responding, then, there would be an argument to wait for further escalations. Inversely, if on the other hand, the cost of a preventative peacebuilding intervention were less than the cost of response, which is always the case, then, it would make good economic sense to intervene providing the interventions were successful. In the latter case, a good risk model that predicted (further eruption of violence of the *anglophone crisis*) and mobilized resources for prevention would be useful provided the **cost-benefit ratio** remains high. At a global level, IEP estimates that the cost of armed conflict was more than \$US740Billion in 2015, a figure which only 1 per cent of it went into peacebuilding.

¹⁷ The two IEP risk models are IEP **Like-Country Risk model**; and the IEP **Positive Peace Deficit model**

There however, remain several challenges that must not be ignored. Addressing these challenges for which solutions needs to be found, relate to the actual effectiveness of conflict prevention interventions as well as broader peacebuilding strategy, as this takes us to the next section.

Cameroon, At-Most Risk of an “Anglophone Crisis” Violence Intensification

Recalling the weak structures and peace institutions that Cameroon currently has to sustain a violent-free environment, several reasons points to favour a hotter *anglophone crisis* demonstration.

1) High levels of violence: Following the author’s previous examination on the state of peacefulness in Cameroon in brief, all GPI indicators which measures large deteriorations in peace as it captures a comprehensive and objective measure of violence, conflict and societal safety and security, Cameroon runs a higher risk of plunging into intensified violence. The ongoing crisis spills-over its effect in domains like political instability, and deaths from internal conflicts. Homicides and incarceration rates have increased, as well as *Refugees and IDPs*. Other indicators such as high levels of *Military Expenditure* to combat rising ‘separatist’ is evident, as well as high levels of *Armed Services Personnel*, and high levels of *Weapons Importation*. ***This interprets in that Cameroon has not made any significant move geared towards the reduction in violence, as the ‘anglophone crisis’ gets hotter by the day, rather the GoC’s reluctant has increased civilian access to small arms and light weapons, even as far as other conventional weaponry.*** According to the so-called ‘separatist’, perceived low commitment levels of the GoC, has seen high levels of corruption persisting, with low levels of adequate peace institutions and a workable peacebuilding plan.

2) Low levels of Positive Peace: Without an in-depth understanding of the systemic nature of peace and the factors that supports it, it is impossible to determine what policies actually work and what programs need to be implemented to support them. Measured by Positive Peace Index (PPI), positive peace provides a foundation for researchers as well as policymakers to deepen their understanding of the empirical relationship between peace, cultural factors, governance and economic development. The PPI is unique as it uses statistical techniques to derive factors that creates and sustains peace in Cameroon. It is composed of 24 indicators from eight domains – these domains are the pillars on which peaceful societies resides, and *absence of violence* is not one of them. These domains measures the level of Positive Peace in 163 countries, covering 99.6% percent of the world’s population. Cameroon ranks 144 out of 163 countries with a score of 3.9¹⁸. Looking at Cameroon’s ranks in both PPI and GPI the reader can interpret resilience when it comes to adapting to shocks. Cameroon actually ranks higher in the GPI than it ranks in the PPI, what this means is that, the country is in a state of *positive peace deficit*, which means ***Cameroon is comparatively more vulnerable to external shocks and runs a higher risk of increased levels of violence.*** High levels of Positive Peace is a good predictor of violence outbreak and an excellent tool for adaptability as well.

¹⁸ Positive Peace Index 2018

3) Absence of a Nationwide Holistic *Peacebuilding Program, together with High levels of Violence Containment Expenditure*¹⁹: By a nationwide peacebuilding program, the author refers to a broader set of activities targeted at stopping violence, and highly reducing the risk of a relapse of the same conflict. Maybe upon writing of this article, the author seem to be ignorant on an ongoing large context of peacebuilding in Cameroon, otherwise there is none. Be mindful that, charitable activities are in no way part of a peacebuilding process – however useful they maybe. In the case of Cameroon wherein violence is already ongoing, unfortunately, establishing a peacebuilding program in such a post-conflict environment should be with care and caution. Given the already tight budget of Cameroon, peacebuilding expenditures should consider certain fundamental questions like; *are funds directed in a coordinated and coherent way? Do these funds currently match the nation’s needs and levels of peace and conflict? Will those funds positively have a long-term impact in mitigating violence and build peace?* Whatever peacebuilding program, priority areas like ***basic safety and security for Cameroonian citizens mostly affected, political processes, core government functions, basic services and economic revitalization*** must receive remarkable support. Anything other than such holistic peacebuilding program would only waste resources, halt the violence for a while, and have it relapse within a 10-year period or even less, considering the Rwanda peacebuilding program as reference.

4) Other reasons such as perceived GoC’s dormancy and seeming slothfulness, low levels of collective action of fellow citizens, structural divides between belligerent groups, high levels of unemployment, decried marginalization, together with societal fragmentation, as well as acute segmentation are just other factors to add to an ever increasing violence. These external drivers create a sense of rejection and stimulates pain and anger. According to a researcher with Amnesty International – Ilaria Allegrozzi, who says, “If there is such a heavy-handed response to crisis that could otherwise be addressed through dialogues, through development, through education – that’s just a game that the GoC will ultimately lose”. Consequently, it will only increase the disillusionment of communities and push people to join armed groups, said Allegrozzi, in this case the *Anglophone* fighters seeking separation.

Having analyzed the conflict risk factor, and seeing how vulnerable Cameroon is, what measures are there to ensure an appropriate and successful peacebuilding interventions? Prior to proposing a peacebuilding program, the next SECTION (4) will likewise determine the parameters of a successful peacebuilding scheme.

SECTION 4: CAMEROON IN AN URGENT AND DESPERATE NEED FOR A RIGOROUS AND HOLISTIC INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM

As earlier mentioned, researched by DFID, IEP and UNDP all suggest that the cost for conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions can be highly cost-effective when successful, given that the cost of violence and its impact to the global economy is estimated at

¹⁹ IEP defines ***Violence Containment Spending or Expenditure***, as economic activity that relates to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is against people or property.

\$US14.6 Trillion. Notwithstanding the economic weight of the impact of violence on the global economy, when compared to the size of investments geared towards the prevention of conflicts, the above stated amount is ridiculously exorbitant.

Effective peacebuilding interventions can yield records high levels of an economy of peace; reduce the probability for a conflict relapse to the least minimum; reinforce the capacity for institutions and other peace-related structures to build peace and hence, propel growth. In addition, such interventions could reshape the attitudes (psychology) of fellow citizens to increase their potentials for resolving disagreements productively without resulting into violence and destructive conflicts. In this regard, a cost-effective peacebuilding scheme is well able and capable of stopping..., yes stopping the current violence and further escalations as a result of the 'anglophone crisis', as well as reinforce the abilities of ex-combatants and restore their violent-prone attitudes to normalcy.

What Activities do, and What Activities do not, Constitute Peacebuilding?

Looking at the broad sets of so-called peacebuilding activities targeted at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into violent conflicts, security researchers misconstrued what activities count as peacebuilding efforts. Often in the midst of conflict resolution activities, a panoply of peace and security advocates misapprehend objectives of *peacebuilding* on the one hand, and *peacekeeping* and *peacemaking* on the other hand. The former has a preventative focus, which makes it distinct from peacekeeping and peacemaking – whose focus broadly involves activities aimed at ending violence and establishing security. Therefore, the dire need to understand what counts as peacebuilding, how to measure its impact and cost-effectiveness is essential to long-term efforts to prevent violence and build peace, subsequently.

However, conceptually defining peacebuilding involves a **range of activities and measures** targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict by strengthening national capacities and institutions at all levels for proper conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. **This simply means that the immediate end of violence ensuing from the 'anglophone crisis' is only a first step to building long-term peace.** To illustrate, of the 103 countries affected by civil war during the period 1945-2009, only 44 of those countries avoided a relapse into an extension of violence.

A conceptual but agreeable definition of the *range of activities and measures* that constitute peacebuilding since its use by former UN SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the landmark UN report on 'an agenda for peace' in 1992 defined peacebuilding as follows. 'Actions to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into armed conflict'. Given the multiple tested and overlapping definitions of the range of peacebuilding activities and measures, the IEP used another definition of peacebuilding based on the *2009 Report of the UNSG on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. This definition outlines 5 priority areas of activities and measures that constitute peacebuilding. They are *basic safety and security; political processes; core government functions; basic services; and economic revitalization*.

Sustainable Development Goal 16 and Peacebuilding

The 5 priority peacebuilding areas of activities and measures as highlighted above, that constitute what peacebuilding is, when keenly observed are core Sustainable Development Goal 16's objectives²⁰. What this means is that, effectively achieving the UN Sustaining Peace Agenda and the SDG16 is an integral part of a larger context of a holistic peacebuilding procedure. 3 of the 5 priority areas that constitutes what peacebuilding maybe, are directly linked to Goal 16, as both of them (SDG 16 and peacebuilding priority areas) seek a direct response to conflict or attempts to prevent violence.

In addition, peace seems to be a priority to both (SDG 16 and peacebuilding priority areas). To illustrate that Goal 16 has peace as a priority,

- Goal 16 highlights that *conflict is an impediment to development*, as according to the UN, an average of 16 per cent conflict-affected countries met or made progress on their MDGs²¹, and additionally no conflict-affected country achieved the goal of reducing by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate between 1990 and 2015.
- Secondly, Goal 16 identifies with the *drivers of violence*. In a bid to address the drivers of violence, the classical focus was purely on the traditional development agenda of health, education and poverty. Rather, Goal 16 further recognizes *governance, inequalities and institutions* as pillars for consideration to reduce violence.
- Goal 16 further identifies with *negative and positive peace*. Goal 16 consist of 12 targets, measuring **direct violence, drivers of violence, governance and justice**. Goal 16 is a measure of key aspects of both negative peace, which is defined as *the absence of violence or the fear of violence* (direct violence and drivers of violence – 16.1²², 16.2²³) and positive peace, which is defined as *the attitudes, institutions and structures that support and sustain peaceful societies* (governance and justice).
- Goal 16 further identifies with some *drivers of peace*. Target 16.1 is to reduce significantly all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere, which is a main driver of peace.

The above analysis is to substantiate further on the interwoven and mutually reinforcing relationship between SDG 16 and the range of activities and measures that constitute peacebuilding in verity. This therefore means, understanding Cameroon's progress report on her achievement in SDG 16, can determine whether or not the institutions that be in Cameroon pursues effectively peacebuilding processes as a whole, given the context of the *anglophone crisis*.

Cameroon's Poor Performances on SDG 16 Heightens the Need for a Peacebuilding Program

Brief Assessment on Cameroon's Progress in Achieving Goal 16
Without any controversy, Goal 16 invariably described as an enabling or transformative goal happens to be the most ambitious goal of all SDGs and faces unique practical

²⁰ Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

²¹ Millennium Development Goals

²² Reduce all forms of violence

²³ End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture towards children

challenges in its measurement and implementation. However, achieving Goal 16 will make it easier to improve on all other SDGs, according to the IEP.

Below is a brief report on Cameroon's progress and performance in its achievement of Goal 16 against the 12 targets, based on existing data identified by the international community, IEP and other third party organizations.

NB: for sources of data – see footnotes

According to data availability on indicators, Cameroon had data for 18 of the 22 national level SDG 16 indicators, that is, 82 per cent. Unfortunately, only 1 of the 18 indicators are classified as having 'good' performance by the IEP equivalent to only 6 per cent. Even though 22 per cent or 4 of the 18 indicators have shown improvement in the last 12 years, yet, Cameroon's performance is ridiculously low.

According to the respective sources, Cameroon performed 'poorly' in the following targets: 16.1.3 – victims of violence²⁴, 16.2.1 – violence against children²⁵, 16.2.3 – sexual violence against young girls²⁶, 16.3.2 – un-sentenced prisoners²⁷, 16.4.1 – illicit financial flow²⁸, 16.5.1 – Government corruption²⁹, and 16.7.1 – Representative politics³⁰ and 16.10.2 – public access to information³¹.

Cameroon also performed 'fairly' in the following targets: 16.1.1 – intentional homicide³², 16.1.4 – safe walking alone³³, 16.3.1 – under-reporting of violence³⁴, 16.5.2 – government corruption³⁵, 16.6.2 – satisfaction with public services³⁶, 16.7.2 – inclusive decision making³⁷, 16.9.1 – birth registration³⁸, 16.10.1 – violence against journalist³⁹, and 16.a.1 – human rights institutions⁴⁰.

Without any doubt, Cameroon's performance is poor to capacitate the nation to withstand violent shockwaves. This means, the nation is in dire need for a large context of peacebuilding, if the nation hopes to achieve the UN Sustaining Peace agenda together with Goal 16 specifically, and the other SDGs generally.

An Effective, Timely and Robust Peacebuilding Initiative may forestall the Looming Civil War Escalation

Peacebuilding is cost-effective

²⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program/PRIO

²⁵ UNICEF

²⁶ UNICEF

²⁷ UNODC

²⁸ Global Financial Integrity

²⁹ Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer

³⁰ Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) Variable 2.19 – Equal Access Index

³¹ World Justice Report

³² UCDP/PRIO

³³ Gallup World Poll

³⁴ Afrobarometer

³⁵ World Bank, Enterprise Survey

³⁶ Gallup World Poll

³⁷ Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) – Vertical Population Group

³⁸ UNICEF

³⁹ Committee to Protect Journalist, Frontline Defenders

⁴⁰ OHCHR

Understanding how stressed Cameroon's national budget seem to be, especially as Official Development Assistance – ODA (donor spending) turns to reduce drastically, clearly apportioning resources for peacebuilding must be cautiously done. As aforementioned, peacebuilding expenditures needs to stretch across a range of activities to strengthen national capacities and institutions for proper conflict management while laying the foundations of sustainable peace and development. Contextually, Cameroon should find an optimum level of peacebuilding spending, while building the nation's institutional capacities for proper *anglophone crisis* management, with the aim of stopping the ongoing crisis, reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into the crisis. Cameroon's commitment on an upfront spending on preventing further escalations of the already devastating *anglophone crisis*, by investing in peacebuilding efforts will be cost-effective up to the point that, the cost of prevention of further escalations would be lesser than the cost of managing full-blown civil war. Preventative peacebuilding is always cost-effective on condition that the cost of preventing conflict is less than the total reduction in the cost of conflict.

IEP has projected a worst possible 'increasing war scenario' or call it – further escalations of the *anglophone crisis*. The projections results were that, if Cameroon does not increase in peacebuilding from the current low levels, the aftermath will see an intensification of the '*anglophone crisis*', as well as ultimately increase the cost of conflict⁴¹. According to the projections, the current estimates of the ratio of prevention of further escalations of the current levels of violence because of the crisis to the cost of managing a full-blown conflict is 1:16, looking at the cost of peacebuilding in Rwanda as the author's benchmark. Contextually, this means for every CFA1000 that the Government of Cameroon does not spend on peacebuilding now; it will spend CFA16000 because of the cost and impact of conflict (*Anglophone crisis*). Even more interesting is that, the ratio of prevention of further escalations of the *anglophone crisis* to the cost of the government of Cameroon doing nothing at all is 1:10. Meaning given that the government of Cameroon does not do anything at all, it will lose CFA10000 for every CFA1000 that was not spend in increasing the current levels of nationwide peacebuilding. Conversely, the anticipated 'peace scenario', that is if the government steps up its engagement in a holistic peacebuilding program, it will result to the cost of the *anglophone crisis* been reduced drastically in the next 10 years, which is 2029.

In this regard, the peace dividend as mentioned in the case of Sri Lanka would be the difference in the cost of the *anglophone crisis* between the war scenario and the peace scenario. In a global context, given that the current levels of world expenditure on peacebuilding is low, for the world to reap this peace dividend, a more than doubling of current peacebuilding expenditures would be required over what is currently been spent in conflict-affected areas. Peacebuilding expenditures would have to increase from \$US64.8Billion to \$US183.7Billion over the next 10 years. This would lead to an estimated peace dividend of \$US2.94Trillion over the decade, provided the peacebuilding is successful and using the case of Rwanda as a prominent example of a successful peacebuilding. This would invariably mean that if the recommended level of peacebuilding were reached in Cameroon, every dollar invested in preventative

⁴¹ Global Peace Index 2017

peacebuilding would lead to a \$US16 reduction in the cost of the crisis.

Why Exemplify Rwanda's Successful Peacebuilding

In the wake of the 1994 civil war, the Government of Rwanda (henceforth GoR) sort statebuilding through a heavy reliance on its peacebuilding process – particularly in civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention peacebuilding and prevention of violent relapse, even though the GoR highlighted all these processes within a larger context of its development strategy known as **vision 2020**. The central role played by the GoR in directing these peacebuilding processes is one main reason for its success alongside other successful development trajectory, as it enabled more donor funding to achieve highlighted peacebuilding targets. This impliedly means, if Cameroon follows the strategy of Rwanda, then, a lot more donor funding may fall in.

More so, this article proposes a carbon copy of the GoR's peacebuilding strategy, however ensuring modifications be made to fit the Cameroon specific country context. If one assumes that, effective peacebuilding spending leads to a reduction in violence, and if Rwanda is illustrative of the levels of peacebuilding required to reduce violent conflict, then one can comfortably conclude that the levels of peacebuilding expenditure in Cameroon is insufficient. This insufficiency in preventative peacebuilding consequentially reduces the possibility of violence reduction in the anglophone regions specifically and elsewhere, build peace and ensure a non-relapse in the conflict again.

Even more intriguing of the Rwanda's peacebuilding process is that, it provides a real world example over a suitable period of how peacebuilding assistance was assigned to different domains and categories, as this article will outline briefly below. More fascinating is that, considering Rwanda as a prominent example of successful peacebuilding and looking at the cost of peacebuilding in Rwanda, it can serve as the basis for estimating the cost of future peacebuilding efforts in Cameroon.

Priority Areas for Peacebuilding in Cameroon

However inexhaustible, the author proposes three core domains to establish a successful peacebuilding. There are *basic safety and security*, *inclusive political processes* and *core government functions*.

For brevity purposes, this article may not expatiate on all percentages of expenditures in various domains, as this varies within country specific needs. In the **basic safety and security area**, Rwanda peacebuilding paid closed attention to the reintegration and small arms and light weapons control through the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, which contributed greatly to security and stability in the post-conflict environment so that recovery and development can begin. This brings to mind the recently created National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration – CNDDR/NDDRC. Records of the failure of such 'supposed peacebuilding' efforts is evident even prior to its inauguration, why so. Simply because such commissions effectively fits in a larger context of peacebuilding contrary to political opinions, which perceive it as an exclusive solution in itself. It is a politically wise creation but with socially misplaced functions and timing. Other peacebuilding programs stemming from the safety and security area were;

legal and judicial development, and public sector policy and administrative management.

In the **inclusive political process domain**, peacebuilding expenditures went into the *legal and development category*, *democratic participation and civil society category*, as well as *civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution category*. For example in the *legal and judicial category*, the peacebuilding program created the Rwanda National Court System and the Gacaca courts.

Lastly, in the **core government functions domain**, the top five highest peacebuilding expenditure went in *public sector policy and administrative management* like the Rwanda Vision 2020, *public finance management* like the Rwanda MINECOFIN established in March 1997, *legal and judicial development, decentralization and support to subnational governments*, and *democratic participation and civil society categories*.

It is imperative for the GoC to commence complex consultations to draft a cost-effective peacebuilding plan, consistent with the specific context of the *anglophone crisis*. Whatever the peacebuilding programs, they should be consistent with other development strategies taking into consideration the availability of resources, given the projected gloomy economic outlook for 2019 and beyond, when the crisis persist into a civil war.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Given the looming civil war scenario in Cameroon, a preventative peacebuilding can be a sustainable solution. Already justified by its cost-effectiveness, the peace dividends that can accrue could regenerate several multiplier effects in the event of a re-investment in economic activities. According to the writer's analysis based on research, peacebuilding interventions can save up to 65 per cent of the cost of violent conflicts, if such interventions are successful, as was the case of Rwanda.

These forewarnings and projections, if taken into consideration, can benefit the nation as a whole, rather than for the country to wait for violence intensifications to suffer ultimately the economic weight of the cost and impact of violence. As could be seen, Cameroon is at very high risk of further violence escalation, which may spread across other regions and groups, given the high rate of political instability and complexities, and anticipated civilian agitations. If these risks are not neutralized with feasible preventative peacebuilding programs, then, the advent of an upcoming civil war is the verdict, or for the very least – an intensification of the current levels of violence.

While the **clock ticks towards that doomsday**, the country will be plunged into a violent vicious cycle, with lower levels of economic activities, leading to loss of jobs (higher unemployment). This in itself increases lower interdependence among population groups, as incentives to maintain peace and harmony becomes minimal. The after effect of such vicious cycles slows down growth and breaks the positive cyclical relationship between peace and a buoyant economy.

Even more intriguing is Cameroon's slow entrance into a **conflict trap**, whereby the impact of the *anglophone crisis* further increases some of the risk factors of other social

conflicts. This means that, low socio-economic development in Cameroon can support the conditions for other related social violence and conflict, as it is a consequence of violence and conflict notwithstanding. In all, the holistic art of peacebuilding processes can change the course of things; but until then, the *clock keeps ticking...*

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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The organization has as objectives to provide humanitarian and social services to the “underprivileged” groups of persons. Most importantly, it also seeks to inspire and embolden youth’s involvement in nation and state building activities within the context of societal reconstruction through peace learning. This paper is a partial reflection on a holistic and rigorous research conducted by the author on *“Positive Peace for Africa”*, a peacebuilding project with objectives to implant a peace culture through *education* on the variables of the sustainable developments agenda 2030. In addition, other analogous research work carried out by the author within the context of peacebuilding are; *Governance in Africa, Roles of Religious bodies in Peacebuilding, Positive Peace and the Media.*

